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I. INTRODUCTION

Contract law primarily focuses on differentiating between promises
that warrant enforcement and promises that do not.1 The courts and
classical commentators use principles of voluntarism 2 as the main
theoretical standard to demarcate between enforceable, valid contracts
and unenforceable, invalid ones.
The duress defense reflects the importance of consent in contract
3
law by excusing a contract obligation if the agreement is coerced
IWe could imagine a world in which promises were enforceable simply on the basis of the
moral suasion of the promise. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 8 (1981) ("By promising we
transform a choice that was morally neutral into one that is morally compelled."). So conceived,
a promise alone could trigger contract liability. If the promissory quality of a statement alone
could result in its enforceability, then the legal inquiry would be limited to an examination of
the words used to determine whether they were promissory. Once a statement is determined
to be a promise, it would be binding. Such a system would obviate the need for careful legal
delineation between enforceable and unenforceable promises. Nevertheless, "[iut is indeed very
doubtful whether there are many who would prefer to live in an entirely rigid world in which
one would be obliged to keep all one's promises instead of the present more viable system, in
which a vaguely fair proportion is sufficient." Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV.
553, 573 (1933). For various reasons, the law limits the types of promises that are enforced.
See C. FRIED, supra, at 3 (discussing the limited nature of promise enforcement); see also
Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) (reviewing the will,
reliance, efficiency, fairness, and bargain theories of contract and advocating the adoption of a
consent theory to determine which contracts should be enforced); Cohen, supra, at 571-85
(reviewing the history of contract law and discussing a variety of theories used to justify the
enforcement of promises).
This focus on contract formation and enforcement has prompted criticism from some scholars
who have urged that greater attention be devoted to practical problems of contract performance.
See, e.g., Farnsworth, A Fable and A Quiz on Contracts, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 206, 208-09 (1987).
As one commentator observed:
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions is an essential feature of our
moral, political, and legal discourse ....
Our moral and legal responses to individual behavior are typically based on (what I
shall call) the voluntariness principle. The general assumption is that promises are binding,
rights can be waived, and punishment appropriately applied if, but only if, the relevant
actions are voluntary.
A. WERTHEIMER, COERCION 3-4 (1987).
Others have observed that "'actions are regarded as involuntary when they are performed
under compulsion. . . .An act is compulsory when it has an external origin of such a kind
that the agent or patient contributes nothing to it."' Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 564 n.85 (quoting ARISTOTLE, ETHICS
(NICHOMACHEAN] III, at 1109b30-1110a16 (J. Thomson trans. 1976)).
1 Initially the doctrine of duress reflected the importance of the principle of voluntarism as
a determinant of enforceability. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH.
L. REV. 253, 254-56 (1947) (discussing how the concept of duress evolved to dovetail with free
will notions). But see Mather, Contract Modification Under Duress, 33 S.C.L. REV. 615, 638
(1982) (explaining the current conceptual basis for duress claims as one to "distinguish between
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or not fully voluntary.' The law will enforce only consensual agreements 5-those that are reached voluntarily. If a promisor is cobargains that enhance the prospects for mutual benefit and those that do not").
The duress defense is powerful because it raises the fundamental issue of the degree of
consensual behavior required to trigger contract liability. Under a system committed to voluntarism, see supra note 2, the plea that "'I was forced into doing it,'" A. WERTHEIMER, supra
note 2, at 3, seems particularly compelling.
Traditionally, scholars did not confront the question of what minimum amount of choice was
required to validate an agreement. This was largely a result of the mythical but widespread
perception that parties had autonomy and that real differences in bargaining power, market
leverage, or wealth did not impair such autonomy. Under this view, all contracting parties were
presumptively free to choose, or not, as they wished. Moreover, because "[clapitalist theory
typically assumes that market transactions are voluntary and uncoerced, even if they are made
against a background of economic necessity," A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 4-5, courts did
not confront issues of impaired choice that might result from such economic necessities. See
also Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 195,
207 (1987) (describing two "paranoid" individuals negotiating at arm's length as the conceptual
basis of classical contract law); Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as
an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 475-76 (1983) (discussing the
presumption of equality among all contracting parties in classical contract law and its continuing
impact).
Recognition of a duress-based excuse from contractual obligations illustrates a modern tendency
to provide avoidance mechanisms for parties who are unfairly disadvantaged by the bargaining
process. This insures that contracts comport with relevant societal norms. See, e.g., Hillman,
The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103, 104 (1988) ("Although based in
part on the principle of freedom of contract, modern contract law is also tempered . . . by
principles, such as reliance and unjust enrichment, that focus on fairness and the interdependence
of parties rather than on parties' actual agreements."); see also Dalton, An Essay in the
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1024 (1985) ("The doctrines of duress
and unconscionability are self-consciously 'public' insofar as they are designed to police the
limits of 'fair' bargain."). Expanded notions of fraud and undue influence serve much the same
purpose. See James & Gray, Misrepresentation-PartII, 37 MD. L. REV. 488, 523-27 (1978)
(discussing expanded notions of actionable fraud).
This Article, while recognizing the jurisprudence of duress as a tool for promoting distributive
justice and fairness, posits other, as yet unrecognized, policies that are either implicit in extant
case law or that should be adopted to guide duress outcomes. These policies, which are not
based on fairness, serve to reorient the jurisprudence away from duress as an altruistic doctrine.
4 See, e.g., Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, 365, 120 A.2d 11, 13 (1956) (explaining
that the basis of the duress doctrine is the absence of "actual consent").
Commentators have criticized the notion that coerced agreements are not enforceable because
they evidence less than "real" consent. These scholars have argued that contrary to accepted
notions, the consent in coerced agreements is very real. Professor Dalzell, for example, states:
When we do stop to think about it, however, it is . . . plain that the more unpleasant the
prospective alternative, the more genuine is the consent to the contract necessary to escape
that alternative; in other words, that the consent to a contract resulting from duress is
probably far more real than the typical contractual consent.
Dalzell, Duress By Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C.L. REV. 237, 240 (1942) [hereinafter Dalzell,
Duress I]; see also Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603,
606 (1943) (arguing that even choices made between unpalatable alternatives are the result of
free will); Philips, Are Coerced Agreements Involuntary?, 3 LAW & PHIL. 133, 133-34 (1984)
("The supposition that coerced actions are involuntary is the result of a natural error. . . . A
coerced agent is presented with unwanted, unpleasant alternatives, but is free to choose and to
act upon the least obnoxious of them."). As Justice Holmes explained "'[lit always is for the
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erced into entering into a contract, she is entitled to avoid the
agreement at her option6 because the agreement does not deinterest of a party under duress, to choose the lesser of two evils. But the fact that a choice
was made according to interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of duress properly
so called."' Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918), quoted in Hale,
supra, at 618.
Professor Dawson's critique of the "reality of consent" standard, see Dalzell, Duress I, supra,
at 238-40, was the most trenchant of all. See Dawson, supra note 3. Dawson posited that the
very notion of consent was a false one since all agreements were coerced. See id. at 266. It
follows that it makes no sense to separate valid from invalid agreements depending on whether
the consent was real.
I The Restatement reflects the consensualism standard when it states: "the formation of a
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange
and a consideration." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1979). Orthodox bargain
theory constituted the traditional mechanism for insuring a mutual exchange.
Recently, critics have undermined the centrality of the consensual model by delegitimizing
it and depicting it as a vehicle for protecting privilege and oppression. "[I]n modern society,
we have begun to question the legitimacy of the order of power established by the uninhibited
exploitation of the potentialities of ownership and knowledge." H. COLLINS, THE LAW OF
CONTRACT 12 (1986); see also R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 121 (1986)
(discussing trends in the critical legal studies movement involving theorists who posit law's
function in perpetuating "social divisions and hierarchies"); Feinman, Critical Approaches to
Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 852 (1983) [hereinafter Feinman, Critical Approaches]
(discussing the function of "[contract] law as a legitimating ideology and as an expression of
legal consciousness" which "conceal[s] the reality of economic injustice in society"); Hillman,
supra note 3, at 110-13 (discussing the Critical Legal Studies idea that contract law legitimizes
the perpetuation of inequalities).
Modern critics have also debunked notions of consensualism by depicting the liberal conception
of contract law, on which consensualism is premised, as value laden rather than value neutral.

See M.

HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN,LAW,

1780-1860, at 201 (1977) ("The

emergence of the objective theory, then, is [a] measure of the influence of commercial interests
in the shaping of American Law. . . . [A] legal ideology of formalism [was elaborated] that
could . . .disguise gross disparities of bargaining power under a facade of neutral and formal
rules .... ").This critique opened the legal system up to questioning on the nature of its
adopted underlying values, including the value of consensual exchange.
Legal critics have also undermined the centrality of the consensualism principle of individual
freedom to contract by emphasizing the "counterprinciples" of community and family. See, e.g.,
R. UNGER, supra, at 60-75. These competing principles lead to indeterminate results because
the judiciary has to choose between conflicting values. See Dalton, supra note 3, at 1006, 101012 (discussing the "tension" attributable to the clash between liberal freedom of contract and
regulatory conceptions of contract law); Feinman, CriticalApproaches, supra, at 847 (positing
that "the two [models of individual autonomy and collectivism] are fundamentally in conflict").
Some recent scholarship has sought to reaffirm the importance of consensualism principles
in contract law, albeit in a modified form.
If the "death of contract" movement is a product of a disillusionment with and abandonment
of both the will theory of contract as a distinct source of contractual obligation and the
bargain theory of consideration as the means of formally distinguishing between enforceable
and unenforceable exercises of the will, the "resurrection of contract" is a recognition of
contract law's proper function as a transfer mechanism that is conceptually dependent on
more fundamental notions of individual entitlement.
Barnett, supra note 1, at 321; see, e.g., Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability
Emerging Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L.
REV. 895, 905-08 (1987) (advocating an approach focusing on assent as a basis for finding
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serve enforcement.7

Duress cases involve multifarious fact patterns" in which the alleged
coercer offers her victim two unpalatable alternatives. Archetypal choices are: "your money or your life" 9 or "your last ten
contractual liability in cases in which explicitly reciprocal or formalized contracting is unlikely
to occur); see also Feinman, Contract After the Fall (Book Review), 39 STAN. L. REV. 1537,

1538 (1987) (reviewing H.

COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT

(1986)) (describing neoclassical

scholars' use of assent-based theory to "produce predictable, yet flexible, legal doctrines that
balance mutual assent and public regulation").
6A
successful duress claim permits avoidance of the obligation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 175 comment d (1979) ("Duress by threat results in a contract voidable by
the victim."); see also E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.19, at 267 (1982) (recognizing a
duress victim's right to avoid contracts induced by threats); Fingarette, Victimization: A Legalist
Analysis of Coercion, Deception, Undue Influence, and Excusable Prison Escape, 42 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 65, 65 (1985) (recognizing duress as one of many "legal excuses and pleas in
avoidance").
Because duress renders the contract voidable but not void, the victim is given the option of
performing or not. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra, § 4.19, at 267. Nevertheless, some contracts
involving duress are void: those that involve nonvolitional behavior. See A. WERTHEIMER, supra
note 2, at 46; see also infra note 9 (discussing nonvolitional behavior).
7 See Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 81 (1981) (noting
that under duress "any agreement [a party] makes is not morally binding"); see also A.
WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 46 (proposing a theory that "yields the conclusion that a contract
is binding if and only if it ought to be binding"). Professor Wertheimer states that "[a] coerced
promise is not morally binding." Id. at 3; see also Mather, supra note 3, at 625 n.33 (indicating
that "duress is coercion inducing an agreement the law ought not to enforce").
I Claims of duress regularly involve varied fact patterns. Professor Dalzell deftly broke these
situations down into: (1) refusals to turn over goods to their owner; (2) refusals to provide
utility services; (3) threats by government officials; (4) threats to breach contracts; and (5)
threats by one spouse against the other. Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 241-77. Current
commentators treat duress claims differently, often considering all fact patterns together and
developing theories to identify the central elements of coercion to be applied across a wide
range of situations. See Westen, supra note 2, at 559, 559-69 (identifying the "core elements
of coercion"); see also A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2 (examining the concept of coercion from
both a philosophical and a legal perspective); Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND
METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL

440 (S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M. White

eds. 1969) (discussing the conditions for coercion generally).
I This "paradigm" case is discussed by Professor Wertheimer in A. WERTHEIMER, supra note
2, at 6-7. Professor Frankfurt would call proposals of this ilk "biconditional." Frankfurt, Coercion

and Moral Responsibility, in

ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION

65, 66 (T. Honderich ed. 1978).

For example, "when a highwayman tells a traveller that it's his money or his life, biconditionality
is presumably intended: the highwayman will kill the traveller if the traveller refuses to hand
over his money, while he will spare his life otherwise." Id. at 66-67. The case of the threatened
death to the robbery victim would constitute physical duress. These "paradigmatic" situations
have provided a ready basis for excuse even in the traditional world of limited relief from
contract liability. See Fingarette, supra note 6, at 72.
The above example involves a "constrained" choice. A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9-10.
A constrained choice is "one where the agent is confronted with unwanted alternatives, but is
quite capable of making rational choices among them." Id. at 9; see also Fingarette, supra note
6, at 74 (distinguishing rational choices made between undesirable alternatives from "sheer
mindless panic"). Professor Wertheimer discusses the concept of constrained choices by contrasting them with "nonvolitional acts." A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9. Nonvolitional

1989]

Duress Policy Guide

cents for a loaf of bread."' 10 Duress defenses also arise when: a promisor threatens not to perform unless she secures added compenacts are characterized by "either serious loss of the ability to reason, or serious loss of selfcontrol from causes other than the loss of reasoning ability" and thus would result in void
contracts. Fingarette, supra note 6, at 76. Professor Wertheimer describes such "involuntary
acts [as] involv[ing] a defect of volition." A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9. These acts are
comparatively rare, and clearly do not warrant enforcement. Id. at 30 (discussing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 492(a)); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Official Draft 1962) ("A
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."), discussed
in Fingarette, supra note 6, at 76 n.29.
An inequality of resources, which restricts the contract alternatives that are available, contributes to constrained choice. See H. COLLINS, supra note 5, at 58 ("In practice, people suffer
constraints from shortages of resources, the costs of action and inaction, and subordination to
the interests of others."). Admittedly, inequalities of resources constrain freedom, and "[a]dvocates
of capitalism need not deny that A's property rights restrict B's freedom to do what he wants
or to satisfy his preferences." A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 253; see also Frankfurt, supra,
at 83-84 (discussing how reactions to the conditions which limit choice differ depending upon
whether the limits are environmentally created or the result of human intervention).
Traditionally, the law has tolerated such cases of constrained choice and refused affected
parties contract avoidance because
for the most part our habitual Anglo-Saxon individualism has been in control of the common
law, so as to make any such curb exceptional. We have been proud of our "freedom of
contract," confident that the maximum of social progress will result from encouragement of
each man's initiative and ambition by giving him the right to use his economic powers to
the full.
Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 237; see also Murphy, supra note 7, at 82 (discussing the
argument for "legitimate 'inequalities of fortune"' (quoting Justice Pitney in Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1, 17 (1914))); Westen, supra note 2, at 560 (positing that coercion does not result
from natural conditions but from "[a] constraint ...

brought to bear on an agent . . . by

another agent"). As the illusory nature of the freedom model became apparent, see Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629,
632 (1943), the courts expanded the duress excuse to offer relief in cases of choice constrained
by economic pressures. See supra note 3.
,oProfessor Dalzell relies on the bread example to illustrate the limits continually placed on
our freedom by the alternatives that we confront. "I agree to pay ten cents for a loaf of bread,
not because I want to give the baker ten cents, but because that's the only way I can get the
bread. I am choosing between alternatives, giving up the dime or doing without the bread."
Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 239. If courts were to find duress on the facts of the bread
case, they would be giving parties a free way out of contractual obligation based on "inequalities
of fortune," supra note 9, for which the other party was not responsible. Denying duress claims
in such circumstances would be consistent with an ideal of individualism in which each party
is "entitled to enjoy the benefits of [its] efforts without an obligation to share or sacrifice them
to the interests of others." Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89

L. REV. 1685, 1713 (1976). For a discussion of the benefits of a system indifferent to
sharing, see Feinman, CriticalApproaches, supra note 5, at 839-42 (discussing self-reliance and
welfare maximization as two of the primary benefits of an individualistic ethos).
If courts broadened available excuses to include economic need, they would be administering
legal rules to favor the less fortunate based on principles of altruism. For a discussion of this
competing principle of altruism in modern contract law, see id. at 842-44 (listing the core
elements of the collectivist ideal for deciding contracts cases including social values and interdependence). See also Kennedy, supra, at 1717-22 (elaborating on the elements of the altruistic
HARV.
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sation" or other concessions, such as more favorable treatment in
unrelated contracts;1 2 a debtor offers a creditor a settlement at less
than the amount actually owed;1 3 an employer threatens an employee
with termination or other undesirable consequences unless the employee agrees to accept an unfavorable settlement on a compensation
claim;' 4 an employer threatens not to hire an employee unless the
employee kicks back part of her wages; 15 someone threatens to criminally prosecute an adult child unless the parents deed their home
to the coercer;'6 or a person threatens to withhold a lifesaving drug
7
or rescue unless the victim pays an "exorbitant" sum.'

ideal). If altruism determined outcome, there might be a disincentive to do business with parties
of lesser wealth for fear that courts would routinely overturn the contractual obligations of the
injured party.
1"
See, e.g., Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902) (holding that
second contract for greater compensation entered into upon refusal to perform first contract
was unenforceable for lack of consideration); Gross Valentino Printing Co. v. Clarke, 120 Ill.
App. 3d 907, 912-13, 458 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (1983) (second contract for additional compensation
not found to be coercive in absence of evidence that legal redress would have been inadequate).
12See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971) (holding that a refusal to supply goods under an existing contract unless
the purchaser agreed to buy supplier's goods for an unrelated contract was coercive).
,3
Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978)
(holding actionable a claim of duress by a company in imminent danger of bankruptcy which
accepted $97,500 in satisfaction of a contract claim valued at between $260,000 and $300,000);
Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1984)
(relying on Totem for a similar holding).
11
See, e.g., Perkins Oil Co. v. Fitzgerald, 197 Ark. 14, 121 S.W.2d 877 (1938) (upholding a
jury finding of duress when an employer threatened to discharge the stepfather of an employee
injured at his workplace unless the employee accepted an unfavorable personal injury settlement
offer); Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404 (1950) (duress claim allowed
when a current employer threatened a discharge if the employee did not accept an unfavorable
settlement offer for unpaid wages made by the previous employer); Mitchell v. CC. Sanitation
Co., 430 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (holding actionable a claim of duress by an at will
employee threatened with discharge unless he signed a release for personal injuries sustained
while working).
15 Caivano v. Brill, 171 Misc. 298, 11 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Mun. Ct. 1939).
16Haumont v. Security State Bank, 220 Neb. 809, 374 N.W.2d 2 (1985).
17Economists might question the assertion that any price could be "exorbitant" even for a
lifesaving drug. The theory would be that the price, though high, is value-maximizing for the
sick person because the price represents the value attached to the drug because of its lifesaving
capacity. The economists might, however, refuse to enforce a similar promise made in another
context, but for a different reason. If A agrees to aid B, who is lost in a snowstorm, only if
B cedes all her wealth to A, Judge Posner would refuse enforcement because if courts awarded
"the whole value of the rescue, . . . people [would be induced] to take socially excessive
precautions to avoid having to be rescued, as well as inducing an excessive investment in
resources devoted to rescue." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 175 (1986) (footnote
omitted).
The example of having to pay a very high price for a lifesaving drug is discussed in Murphy,
supra note 7, at 83. Professor Murphy argues that if the pressure on the victim results from
circumstances not caused by the "coercer," "then it seems that something stronger is needed
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In all of these cases one person pressures another into making
contract concessions or accepting unfavorable terms that she would
not otherwise have agreed to had other, more desirable, alternatives
existed'8 or had the coercion not been applied.1 9 The victim acquiesces
because the coercer's superior bargaining power, or the victim's desperate circumstances, leaves little room to resist or to bargain for
better terms. The court's task is to determine when the promisor
should be offered a reprieve from her ordinary contract obligations
because the underlying agreement is not voluntary.
The current law of duress is wholly unsatisfactory. This is due in
part to a misguided focus on whether duress is a public or private doctrine. In the heyday of classical contract law, courts and
commentators focused on private law concepts, viewing duress as
a means by which parties could escape agreements that contravened their will.20 Professor Dawson offered another conceptual
to free me from my obligation than the claim that all of my alternatives are grim or the claim
that the situation is not my fault." Id. Permitting avoidance merely because the sick party
faced grim and desperate choices would potentially open up all bargains to avoidance claims.
18The freedom to choose is never untrammeled and rarely does one have the freedom to
choose among only desirable alternatives. Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 239 ("[Ilt is easy
to forget that a will exercises its freedom only in selecting one of several possible courses of
action."). The fact that the choice is constrained does not automatically lead to a successful
duress claim.
19Professor Westen voices this formulation of coercion when he states "[t]o say that X,
'coerced' X into doing something means that X chose to do something that, but for the constraint
or promise of constraint X, brought to bear on him, X would not have chosen to do." Westen,
supra note 2, at 565-66; see also Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, NoMos XIV (Am. Soc'y Pol.
& Legal Phil.) 19 (J.Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1972) ("[A] further requirement for a person
to be coerced is that he would have chosen differently had he not been threatened.").
20Professor Atiyah and others have rejected the overborne will theory as a conceptual basis
for duress. Atiyah argues for its abandonment in Atiyah, Economic Duress and the "Overborne
Will," 98 LAW Q. REV. 197, 201 (1982) (suggesting that will theory belongs on the "historical
scrapheap"). See also Note, Economic Duress After the Demise of the Free Will Theory: A
Proposed Tort Analysis, 53 IOWA L. REV. 892, 894 (1968) ("The free will concept, however, has
serious shortcomings. Because both normal contracts and those formed under duress result from
a choice between alternative evils, it is impossible to distinguish one situation from the other
on the basis of any difference in the freedom of the consent."). Professor Fingarette suggests
that although the language used to describe overborne will theory, Fingarette, supra note 6, at
71, is "rhetorically rich," it lacks "objective specificity of meaning." Id. at 72. Accordingly, he
would redirect the inquiry to whether there was "unfair choice." Id. at 79.
Despite the criticism of the overborne will theory as an explanation for duress case outcomes,
courts continue to use the free will standard as an arbiter of enforceability. See, e.g., Wilson
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 228 So. 2d 229, 232 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (rejecting economic
duress as a ground for invalidating release and noting that duress involves free will being
overborne); Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 51, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950)
(indicating that the test of coercion is "whether the coercion was of such a character as to
overcome the free will of the victim"); Manufacturers Am. Bank v. Stamatis, 719 S.W.2d 64,
68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that "[tihe evidence showed a fear of criminal penalties and
other consequences, which may not have actually existed, but the threats of which may have
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basis, 21 positing that duress serves a public, not private, function.2 2

In Dawson's view, the duress defense is an "underground 23 method
of policing abuses in the bargaining process, regulating inequalities
of bargaining power, 24 and correcting inadequacies of consideration.21

Moreover, his perception of the "broader objectives" 26 of duress law
fueled a philosophical debate that still rages: Is contract law primarily
concerned at its "core ' 27 with facilitating private bargains free from
been sufficient to overcome the duress claimant's free will"); Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J.
359, 365, 120 A.2d 11, 13 (1956) ("Duress in its more extended sense means that degree of
constraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, sufficient in severity
or in apprehension to overcome the mind or will of a person of ordinary firmness .... "); Port
of Nehalem v. Nicholson, 122 Or. 523, 259 P. 900 (1927) (positing a standard for duress based
on overcoming free will), overruled on other grounds, Godell v. Johnson, 244 Or. 587, 418 P.2d
505 (1966); First Tex. Say. Ass'n v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982) (using a test for duress based on overcoming free will).
21Professor Dawson's 1947 article is still considered the seminal work on duress. See Dawson,
supra note 3. It not only reoriented conceptual theories of duress but also undermined the
traditional importance of the much vaunted, and in Dawson's view, much overrated, concepts
of consensualism and private autonomy in contract law. Id. at 266-67; see also supra note 5
(tracing the debunking of consensualism in the literature).
22 Among the public factors Professor Dawson identified as determining outcome in duress
cases are unequal bargaining power and unjust enrichment. Dawson, supra note 3, at 253, 28283; see also Dawson, Duress Through Civil Litigation: II, 45 MICH. L. REV. 679, 715 (1947)
(suggesting the importance of gain by coercer in context of duress claims); Hale, supra note 4,
at 628 (suggesting a public approach based on "judicious legal limitation on the bargaining
power of the economically and legally stronger" party in the context of duress); Note, supra
note 20, at 896-900 (documenting various public policies behind the duress doctrine that can
be used to supplement analysis in deciding duress cases).
Courts have legitimized the importance of the bargaining power factor in deciding duress
claims. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560, 563 (Ala. 1985) (finding
that the duress claimant lacked reasonable alternatives in the face of duress attributable to the
"superior bargaining power" of the purported coercer); Day v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc., 480
N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (finding no actionable duress because the purported coercer
"was not in a dominant position"); King Enters. v. Manchester Water Works, 122 N.H. 1011,
1014, 453 A.2d 1276, 1277 (1982) (scrutinizing the bargaining process and finding "free and
voluntary negotiations" based on changes in the terms of an agreement which benefitted the
plaintiff); Ross Sys. v. Linden Dari-Delite, Inc., 35 N.J. 329, 337-38, 173 A.2d 258, 263 (1961)
(finding duress when claimant franchisee was forced to make overpayments to a franchisor
whose control prevented franchisee from pursuing litigation as an alternative); Caivano v. Brill,
171 Misc. 298, 299, 301, 11 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500, 502 (Mun. Ct. 1939) (finding duress in a kickback
arrangement between employer and employee based on "clear recognition of the fact that
employer and employee do not meet as equals").
- G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 56-57 (1974) (discussing "case law undergrounds"
involving a "pre-contractual duty"). For a further discussion of these "undergrounds," see
Gordon, Book Review, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1216 (reviewing G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
(1974)).
24 Dawson, supra note 3, at 253.
1 Id. at 276-82.
21 Id. at 253.
27 Kennedy, supra note 10, at 1737 (discussing the traditional concept of classical contract
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state interference, with public regulation of unfair agreements being
mere sideshows; or is such a core principle impossible precisely because
of the important countertendency of public regulation, 8 thereby leading to open warfare between private and public norms?2 9
The philosophical debate only serves to distract decisionmakers
from important duress issues. Furthermore, the articulations and
applications of the duress rule itself are unsatisfactory. Courts have
faced intractable problems in determining if coercion exists in a
particular case. Courts and commentators have articulated different
theories of coercion-including theories based on-will or moralityin the hope that a statement of an overall theory can be used to
define the "core elements" 30 of the defense. These theories, however,
law consisting, at the core, of principles founded on autonomy and individualism in which the
"existence of countertendencies was acknowledged, but in a backhanded way" and relegated
away from the core to the "periphery"); see supra note 5 (discussing this conflict in the scholarly
literature).
" For a discussion of the role of counterprinciples and norms in modern contracts jurisprudence,
see R. UNGER, supra note 5, at 60-75. See also Dalton, supra note 3, at 1010-12 (discussing
public values that stand in opposition to private values of autonomy and the suppression of
such values by the traditional contract model); Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 5, at
834 (discussing the emergence of tort-like values into the previously private world of contract);
Kennedy, supra note 10, at 1713-24 (discussing counterprinciples of individualism and altruism).
29Legal scholars and philosophers have fiercely debated the issue of whether contract law is
private in the sense that it merely implements the private agenda of the parties or whether it
has a public component that actively interferes with private choices in order to validate important
social values of fairness and community. See, e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 5, at 60-75 (discussing
"counterprinciples" to freedom of contract values); see also Dalton, supra note 3, at 1010-39
(discussing the history of "public" and "private" aspects of contract theory); Feinman, Critical
Approaches, supra note 5, at 830-36 (discussing the values of individualism in the classical
model and public policy agenda in modern contract law); Gordon, supra note 3, at 207-13
(contrasting public with private values); Hillman, supra note 3, at 104 (noting the "conflicting
principles" of autonomy and fairness); Kennedy, supra note 10, at 1685 (discussing the impact
of approaches based on "individualism" and "altruism" as applied to substantive private law
issues); Kostritsky, supra note 5, at 958-61 (discussing this fundamental contradiction in modern
contract theory).
-oOne device for identifying coercive proposals focuses on the distinction between coercive
threats and noncoercive offers, with "[t]he most fundamental difference between threats and
offers . . . [being] this: a threat holds out to its recipient the danger of incurring a penalty,
while an offer holds out to him the possibility of gaining a benefit." Frankfurt, supra note 9,
at 67.
The difficulty with the threat/offer distinction is that all contracts contain implied threats.
Dawson, supra note 3, at 266 ("[Tlhe freedom of the 'market' was essentially a freedom of
individuals and groups to coerce one another ....").Moreover, in order to apply the test one
requires a further device for determining when a penalty exists. Professor Westen proposes a
definitional paradigm for coercion which can be used in determining if a penalty exists:
(13) a constraint or promise of constraint, Y, that X, knowingly brings to bear on X in
order that X choose to do something, Z., that X would not otherwise do and that X does
not wish to be constrained to do, where X knows that X, is bringing or promising to bring
Y to bear on him for that purpose, and where the constraint renders X's doing Z, more
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are inadequate because they are unworkable and because they inhibit
courts from considering important policy concerns. Confusion prevails
in duress law;31 consequently courts cannot reach consistently sound
results.
The "will theory, 3 2 which attempts to ascertain whether the coercer's pressure or threat has actually overborne a claimant's will,33 is
defective because it requires courts to ascertain the unknowable: the
actual intent of the party alleging duress. 34 Morality-based theories
eligible to X than it would otherwise be.
Westen, supra note 2, at 569.
Joseph Raz offers his own definition of coercion as follows:
P coerces Q into not doing act A only if .. .
(1) P communicates to Q that he intends to bring about or have brought about some
consequence, C, if Q does A.
(2) P makes this communication intending Q to believe that he does so in order to get
Q not to do A.
(3) That C will happen is, for Q, a reason of great weight for not doing A.
(4) Q believes that it is likely that P will bring about C if Q does A and that C will
leave him worse off, having done A, than if he did not do A and P did not bring about C.
(5) Q does not do A.
(6) Part of Q's reason for not doing A is to avoid (or to lessen) the likelihood of C by
making it less likely that P will bring it about.
Raz, Liberalism, Autonomy, and the Politics of Neutral Concern, in 7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 89, 108 (P. French, T. Uehling, Jr. & H.
Wettstein eds. 1982), discussed in A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 203 n.4.
31
Confusion persists because the duress determination is not simply a factual or empirical
question in all cases. See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 31 (suggesting that volitional/
constrained choice duress cases are "at least partially moralized" and not purely "empirical");
see also Westen, supra note 2, at 544 ("'Justice' and 'duress' . . . are normative by definition.").
Because the test is not purely empirical, it cannot be administered mechanically and is subject
to uncertain manipulation based upon social norms.
Confusion in the duress case law also exists because "coercion is a single concept that is
sufficiently open-textured to encompass a range of diverse and mutually inconsistent norms,"
id. at 547, and can be used "to advance normatively inconsistent positions." Id. at 548. The
conflict in norms is something that plagues contract law adjudication in all contexts. See Gordon,
Historicism in Legal Scholarship,90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1025 (1981) [hereinafter Gordon, Historicism]
(noting the failure of thinking that purports to use "suprahistorical norms transcending time
and space" to decide conflicts between competing norms); see also Feinman, CriticalApproaches,
supra note 5, at 834 n.19 (discussing the level at which various scholars would interject social
policy judgments into their systems). But see Hillman, supra note 3, at 104 (suggesting conflicting
values can be and are accommodated within one system with the "freedom of contract and
other principles shar[ing] the spotlight"). For another insight into the reason for the confusion,
see Ogilvie, Economic Duress, Inequality of BargainingPower and Threatened Breach of Contract,
26 McGILL L.J. 289, 289 (1981) (discussing the fact that "[n]o clear formulation of an underlying
rationale of 'economic duress' or its necessary elements has appeared in the jurisprudence to
date").
See infra notes 61-62.
3'Such a fact-finding approach is arguably an empirical one. A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2,
at 7-8 (discussing empirical criteria).
" Because the actual intent of the party alleging duress cannot be known, the "inquiry
therefore becomes indirect-we turn to objective evidence of the party's subjective intent."
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focus not on the promisor's free will but on whether the coercer's
behavior violates moral norms (or a "moral baseline"). 35 Moralitybased theories are unworkable because there exist many different
potential baselines, but no clearly articulated factors to identify the
appropriate one. 36 In addition, morality-based theories require courts
to answer questions in the abstract without regard to the actual social
consequences of their decisions. 37 The approach followed by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts38 offers no better solution because its
doctrinal elements are open-ended, ambiguous, and almost impossible
39
to apply with any predictability.
Because the theories of coercion offer little help, courts manipulate
the doctrinal elements, sometimes dispensing with or ignoring one or
more of them. 40 Courts conveniently attach a label to their conclusions
Dalton, supra note 3, at 1025. But this shifts the focus to the behavior of the other party and
the empirical terms of the deal. Id.
31For a discussion of moral baseline theory, see A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 206-214
(reviewing aspects of Robert Nozick's theory as elaborated in Nozick, supra note 8, at 440);
Westen, supra note 2, at 572 (discussing baseline theory in relation to changes in conditions).
36Professor Wertheimer acknowledges that actually setting an appropriate moral baseline
requires "nothing less than a complete moral and political theory." A. WERTHEIMER, supra
note 2, at 217; see id. at 206-11 (illustrating the complexities and difficulties involved in
establishing a baseline). Note that in spite of these complications, Wertheimer's argument
incorporates a moral baseline. Id. at 267; see also Mather, supra note 3, at 615 ("tests [for
coercion] fail to produce determinate results when moral coloration is not clear").
17 See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 237 (taking the position that "'external'
or policy
considerations should have little bearing on the validity of a coercion claim"). Wertheimer
thinks that the elements of coercion should be developed in the abstract and that policy
considerations and consequences should not be determinative of the threshold question of
whether duress exists. Id.
11The doctrinal tests for duress are outlined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 175-176 (1979). The core elements of the Restatement test include "improper threat" and
"no reasonable alternative." Id. § 175; see infra note 108.
19The doctrinal tests for duress are not self-executing because the concept is "normative by
definition.. . . [Dienominating A's conduct toward B as 'duress' in some sense condemns A's
conduct, because 'duress' is defined as a normatively illegitimate compulsion." Westen, supra
note 2, at 544-45. The doctrinal formulation forces courts to grapple with normative questions
that are difficult to resolve.
OFor a general discussion of the manipulability of doctrinal elements in contract law, see
Gordon, Historicism, supra note 31, at 1025 ("(Slupposedly purely technical schemes of offerand-acceptance rules, for instance, [have been] shown to be indefinitely manipulable in theory
to reach the results of 'contract formed' or 'no contract formed' in any particular case ....
").
See also Feinman, Critical Approaches, supra note 5, at 834 (recognizing the inevitable impact
of policy judgments on legal outcomes).
The general manipulability of doctrinal elements is reflected in the duress case law. Courts
have, for example, inconsistently applied the "no reasonable alternative" prong of the Restatement
approach. See supra note 38; infra note 108. In some instances, courts interpreting this doctrinal
requirement have required that a party seeking avoidance rights on the ground of duress pursue
legal remedies as a precondition to a successful recovery under duress; in other instances they
have not done so. For example, in London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal.
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based on the presence or absence of these elements without explaining
why they have reached different conclusions using the same doctrinal
Rptr. 262 (1965), a developer pursued a subdivision development and attempted to acquire the
defendant's land. Id. at 235, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 263. At a critical stage in the developer's (plaintiff's
predecessors) efforts, the defendant demanded money in excess of the agreed upon contract
price for a land tract. Id. at 236, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 264. Because a substantial delay would have
imperiled development plans, the developer acquiesced. Id. at 237, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 264. The
court rejected a duress claim on those facts, finding the failure to pursue legal relief a business
decision. Id. at 239, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 265-66; see also Adams v. Schiffer, 11 Colo. 15, 17 P. 21
(1888), quoted in Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure II, 20 N.C.L. REV. 341, 342 (1942)
[hereinafter Dalzell, Duress II] (finding in the case "no discussion of the remedies that might
be available"); King Enters. v. Manchester Water Works, 122 N.H. 1011, 1015, 453 A.2d 1276,
1278 (1982) (plaintiff's settlement agreement was not involuntary when plaintiff chose to settle
rather than pursue available legal relief).
The court in Scutti v. State Road Dep't, 220 So. 2d 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) took a
different approach, calling an alternative that required the victim to suffer economic losses
impracticable. In Scutti, when the developers applied for an occupancy permit for a building,
the county denied the request, falsely alleging violations of setback requirements. Id. at 629.
The developers acquiesced in an unfavorable waiver that the state later used to argue a limitation
on potential damages from a subsequent condemnation of the developer's property. Id. In
deciding whether duress was exerted by the county, the court readily recognized that the
developers "could have engaged in litigation." Id. But the court found duress in view of the
fact that pursuit of a legal remedy would have subjected the builders "to a substantial legal
liability to their tenant for inability to deliver possession." Id.; see also Manufacturers Am.
Bank v. Stamatis, 719 S.W.2d 64, 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (third-party plaintiff sued bank for
duress even though no evidence was offered that such plaintiff first sought legal relief from
improper demand); Haumont v. Security State Bank, 220 Neb. 809, 814-16, 374 N.W.2d 2, 78 (1985) (parents who transferred life savings and property to a bank to avoid prosecution of
their son permitted to claim duress despite not having sought legal redress); McCubbin v. Buss,
180 Neb. 624, 629, 144 N.W.2d 175, 179 (1966) (employee threatened with termination unless
he gave up stock option rights did not seek legal redress as a precondition to a duress action,
yet the court found that "evidence of business coercion is clear and convincing"); S.S. & 0.
Corp. v. Township of Bernards Sewerage Auth., 62 N.J. 369, 386, 301 A.2d 738, 747-48 (1973)
(upon a showing of "'business complusion,"' claimant was entitled to seek a judicial remedy
despite a contractual agreement waiving any claim of coercion and despite absence of a showing
that duress claimant sought a judicial remedy in response to authority's demand for improper
sewerage connection charges); Peter Matthews, Ltd. v. Robert Mabey, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 943,
944, 499 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256 (1986) (finding that plaintiffs had no "practical alternative" to
succumbing to moving company's demand for liability limitation despite not having sought a
prior judicial remedy); Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 78 A.D.2d 83, 90, 434 N.Y.S.2d 698,
702 (1980) (permitting the seller of a home who paid a mortgage recording tax that a bank
was required by law to pay, to bring action for restitution on the ground of duress despite the
fact that the seller did not seek prior judicial redress on finding that "no realistic alternative"
existed); Peters, Ricker & Co. v. Railroad Co., 42 Ohio St. 275, 285 (1884) (no showing by
duress claimant of an effort to secure a legal remedy to force carrier to transport goods at
required rates, because resort to the courts would not be adequate to save the business), cited
in Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 245-46. A review of the cases cited above reveals that in
some instances the courts do not even discuss the legal redress issue; in other instances, the
court confronts the issue, but differs on the threshold showing of the impracticability of the
legal remedy. Sometimes, the court equates the failure to pursue an available legal remedy with
the taking of a business risk for which the "victim" should not be offered relief.
The differing results in these cases demonstrates the manipulability of the standards governing
the reasonableness of alternatives in a duress claim. See Dalton, supra note 3, at 1034. Despite
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elements in factually similar cases.
Traditional coercion theories and elements are simply inadequate
as an exclusive focus of analysis in duress cases. This Article does
not propose a new theory of duress. Instead, it suggests a refinement
of doctrine in which the courts candidly articulate certain key policy
goals and develop elements based on them. These policy goals include
efficiency, disclosure of unexpected risks, judicial capability, reliance,
and economic incentives. If decisionmakers adopted the policy analyses
suggested here, the predictability of judicial decisionmaking would be
enhanced and a supplemental analysis would be available when the
doctrinal elements become difficult to apply.41 Moreover, this approach
would preserve limited judicial resources, contribute to the efficient
prevention of resource misallocation, 42 reduce judicial capability problems, 43 discourage one party from speculating at the expense of another, 44 provide incentives for economic industriousness, 4 5 and dis46
courage economic negligence.
Part I of this Article has suggested that these policy factors should
the fact that the "'reasonable alternatives' [test] has a reassuringly rational and objective ring,"
id. at 1033, it is difficult to apply with predictable results. The differing approaches to the
question of the necessity of pursuing legal relief may depend on a court's view of whether the
legal remedy is an adequate or impracticable remedy, either because of the delay it will cause
or the inadequacy of the damages available. See Dalzell, Duress II, supra, at 378-82 (discussing
when a legal remedy may be inadequate).
For a different twist on the manipulability of the reasonable alternative prong of duress, see
First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Pepper, 547 F.2d 708, 715 (2d Cir. 1976) ("'no reasonable
alternative"' to fee settlement existed when lawyer refused to turn over corporate papers necessary
to effectuate the closing of an asset purchase, when a lack of papers could have subjected
stockholders to a breach action by the purchaser of the assets). On the other hand, courts have
held that the mere failure to obtain the satisfaction of a "hope of obtaining a gain" should not
qualify for duress relief. See, e.g., Pope v. Ziegler, 127 Wis. 2d 56, 60, 377 N.W.2d 201, 203
(Ct. App. 1985).
Because the determination of whether the remedy is "reasonable" or "adequate" depends on
apparently differing judicial views of how much economic loss the duress claimant should suffer
before being able to claim duress, the doctrinal element of a "reasonable alternative" is infinitely
manipulable. Consequently, a different approach should be adopted. Resolution in all of these
cases should depend not on what economic losses a particular court thinks a duress victim
should be required to assume (because there seems to be no agreement on what loss is enough
to warrant relief other than bankruptcy, which is clearly enough) but on the basis of a systematic
analysis of what policy concerns would be advanced or hindered by a finding of duress.
11In addition, the policies enumerated here may simply help to rationalize results in existing
case law.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 162-249.
41 Judicial capability problems are discussed generally in R. DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM
IN CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (1978). See infra notes 304-21 and accompanying text (examining judicial

capability in the context of duress cases).
"See infra text accompanying notes 322-41.
45 See infra text accompanying notes 360-75.
"See infra text accompanying notes 376-85.
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be considered by courts deciding duress cases and that the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts comments should be expanded to expressly
account for them. Part II will demonstrate that the current analysis
of duress claims leads to a morass of inconsistent and unpredictable
results. It will explore both the inability of theoretical approaches to
resolve these ambiguities in case law, and question their value as
standards for assessing the coerciveness of proposals. 47 This exploration will underscore the need for a more policy-oriented approach.
Part III of this Article suggests several policy factors that should be
used to supplement the Restatement's doctrinal approach to deciding
duress claims, and documents the advantages of adopting these policies
48
in approaching duress claims.

II.

THE MORASS OF CASE LAW-CURRENT APPROACHES TO
' 49
RESOLVING THE "HARD CASES

A.

The Problem of Indeterminacy

The absence of clearly articulated guidelines undermines consistency
and predictability in the use of the doctrinal elements of duress.
Courts often reach inconsistent results on similar facts by manipulating the doctrinal elements of duress. Courts do not agree, for
example, on when a creditor's offer of a reduced settlement posing
See infra text accompanying notes 49-107.

'7

See infra text accompanying notes 120-385. Professor Whitford, commenting on a draft of
this Article, pointed out that the distinction drawn between policy and doctrine in this Article
may be too clear cut. Most doctrines, after all, have some underlying policy rationales. "A well
stated doctrine becomes just an efficient way for testing whether a policy objective will be served
by a particular result." Letter from William C. Whitford to Juliet P. Kostritsky (Feb. 4, 1989).
Conceived in this way and accepting the usual coalescence between underlying policies and
doctrine, the duress doctrinal formulation can be conceptualized as oriented towards achieving
the dual policy objectives of voluntarism and fairness. See Dalton, supra note 3, at 1032-36.
Thus, in one sense, this Article is merely suggesting different policy considerations from those
currently reflected in the doctrinal formulation. In another sense, however, because the current
doctrinal formulation is so ambiguous, manipulable, and oriented to admittedly amorphous
concepts, the manipulation of results does not seem to constitute an efficient resolution of the
defined policy objectives. The doctrinal formulation of duress seems divorced from policy
objectives and the elements merely become labels that courts attach to justify their conclusion
on the duress claim. Thus, the distinction between doctrinal formulation and policy concerns
remains viable.
,1See generally Murphy, supra note 7 (reexamining the concept of hard choices). The hard
cases referred to are those in which one party is presented with two unpalatable choices. See
supra note 9 (discussing biconditional and constrained choices).
48
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economic hardship for the debtor qualifies as actionable duress.50 They
differ on when a threat is improper or wrongful, and when a threat
to exercise a legal right insulates one from a charge of wrongful
action and therefore a finding of duress. Some courts hold that no
wrongful threat can exist when the action threatened lies within one's
legal rights,-' while other courts are willing to find duress even when
the act threatened is entirely lawful standing alone.52 No consensus
exists on what constitutes a "reasonable alternative" to an allegedly
coercive offer such that it will preclude a finding of duress. 3 Some
courts require a duress claimant to demonstrate unsuccessful prior
attempts to settle the dispute through legal means; others omit that
requirement.5 4 Courts have encountered difficulties in determining
what constitutes tolerable "hard bargaining" as opposed to impermissible duress. 5 Finally, courts disagree on when the financial necessities realistically constraining a duress claimant's options should
be attributed to the defendant's (putative coercer's) conduct. Apparently, they agree on the principle that "[t]he mere stress of business
conditions will not constitute duress when the defendant was not
responsible for the conditions, ' 56 but disagree on when the coercer
50Compare Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d 15
(Alaska 1978) (offer of $97,500 on $260-300,000 debt was coercive when debtor knew creditor
faced impending bankruptcy) with Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir.
1983) (general contractor's offer to pay $67,000 of the $120,000 extra costs of completion was
not coercive under Wisconsin law despite subcontractor's financial difficulties) and Hackley v.
Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 576, 8 N.W. 511, 514 (1881) (refusal to pay more than $4,000 on a
claimed debt of $6,200 was not duress, though debtor might be financially ruined if he failed
to obtain the full amount).
51E.g., Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (no actionable
duress found when an employer threatened to fire an employee unless he accepted a severance
settlement because there was "no wrongful conduct"; employer was within his legal rights in
threating termination); Manufacturers Am. Bank v. Stamatis, 719 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (court found evidence "sufficient to submit" a duress claim even though it was not
unlawful for the bank to request that the makers sign a promissory note).
12E.g., McCubbin v. Buss, 180 Neb. 624, 629, 144 N.W.2d 175, 179 (1966) (evidence of duress
was "clear and convincing" when an employer threatened to fire an employee unless the employee
ceded valuable stock option rights, even though the employer acted within his legal rights since
employment was terminable at will). The differing results in the cases, see cases cited supra
notes 50 and 51, suggest that it is erroneous to assert that duress claims will be unsuccessful
when a party threatens to do that which it has a legal right to do. E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 6, § 4.17, at 259.
11For an extended discussion of the manipulability of the reasonable alternative element of
duress, see supra note 40.
4 See, e.g., Adams v. Schiffer, 11 Colo. 15, 17 P. 21 (1888); see infra text accompanying notes
284-95 (discussing Adams).
1 E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 4.17, at 262-64. Professor Farnsworth does not seek to
discourage "hard bargaining between experienced adversaries," but characterizes contracts made
by "a threat to exercise a power for illegitimate ends" as suspect. Id. at 263.
See Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. United States, 531 F.2d 1037, 1042 (Ct. Cl. 1976); see
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is sufficiently responsible for the victim's economic straits for the
57
claim to be actionable.
In order to sort out the morass of results and provide an overall
theory useful for determining the particular circumstances that justify
avoidance of contractual responsibility, courts and commentators have
developed two types of economic coercion theory: 58 "empirical" 59 and
"morality-based.60 The will theory of coercion,6 ' once the dominant
also W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896, 904 (8th Cir. 1957) (holding
that plaintiff must show that "the duress resulted from defendant's wrongful and oppressive
conduct and not by plaintiff's necessities").
57 See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
-This discussion proceeds on the assumption that theories of economic coercion are to be
assessed by Professor Barnett's evaluative criteria. These "criteria for comparing theories include
at least three factors: (a) the number of known problems the theory handles as well or better
than its rivals, (b) the centrality of the problems that the theory handles well, and (c) the
promise that the theory offers for solving future problems." Barnett, supra note 1, at 270; cf.
Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015,
1035 (1978) (discussing components of explanatory legal theory).
59Wertheimer sets up this distinction between empirical and value-laden choices. A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 53.
60Wertheimer posits that the modern law of duress, as reflected in both the "choice" prong
(no reasonable alternative) and the "proposal" prong (improper threat), is infused with moralized
judgments. A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 53; see also Dalton, supra note 3, at 1032-36
(discussing the moralized "substantive fairness" aspects of duress); Fingarette, supra note 6, at
81-82 (asserting that the effort to determine whether real choice or reasonable choice exists
requires resort to "legal norm"); Murphy, supra note 7, at 86-87 (underscoring moral choices
at issue in finding duress).
Professor Dalton notes these value-laden aspects of deciding duress cases when she states:
"The line-drawing exercise actually took the form of distinguishing between unacceptable and
acceptable behavior by the favored party, although this focus was not made explicit." Dalton,
supra note 3, at 1027.
61"Will theories maintain that commitments are enforceabl because the promisor has 'willed'
or chosen to be bound by his commitment." Barnett, supra note 1, at 272. The justification
for basing enforceability on an inquiry into the will was that "'the will is something inherently
worthy of respect."' Id. (quoting Cohen, supra note 1, at 575). In the duress context, the will
theory suggests that courts will find agreements to be unenforceable if the alleged victim
acquiesced against her will.
Critics fault the will theory on several grounds. First, because it is often difficult to ascertain
the actual intent of a party, the approach may be impractical. Id.; see also Dalton, supra note
3, at 1025 (asserting that an approach based on will theory is "rendered unworkable by the
problem of knowledge. We cannot directly know or ascertain the subjective intent of the disfavored
party.") The will theory also is deficient because it fails to explain case law which makes
manifested intent, rather than actual intent, determinative of contract liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1979) (defining promise in terms of "manifestation of
intention"). The emphasis on manifested intent in contract law undermines the importance of
inner will. Under the manifested intent test, a promisor cannot escape contract liability by
alleging that enforcement will violate her true will; if she has led another person reasonably to
expect a commitment, she will be bound. See, e.g., Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods
Co., 127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S.W. 777 (1907). For a discussion of the significance of the manifest
intent principle and the objectification of the will, see Dalton, supra note 3, at 1039-1046.
Finally, courts and commentators have rejected the will theory on normative grounds because
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theory for deciding enforceability questions in this and other areas
of contract law, is considered empirical. 62 A morality-based theory of
coercion, which rejects value-neutral decisionmaking as an impossibility, looks to standards of fairness, distributional concerns, 63 and
other "moral baselines" 64 to decide whether agreements are coerced.
B.

Theories for Resolving the Indeterminacy Problem

65
1. Will Theory: The Paradigm of the Overborne Will

Will theory focuses on whether the promisor who acquiesces in an
agreement has actually consented to the demand, and thus should
be bound, or whether the agreement is voidable because the promisee's
coercion has overborne the promisor's will.66 The theory's focus on
67
the displacement of the individual will implies a psychological test
to determine whether "[a] psychic capacity has been seriously disof the potential threat its adoption would pose for contractual certainty and planning. See, e.g.,
Barnett, supra note 1, at 273 & n.11 (recognizing that relying on subjective evidence of actual
intent "might create a de facto option in the promisor"). As David Hume has said: "'If the
secret direction of the intention . . . could invalidate a contract, where is our security?"' Id.
at 273 n.10 (quoting D. HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 30 n.5
(C. Hendel ed. 1957) (1st ed. 1751)). For a discussion of the shift from the subjective to the
objective theory of contract law and its implications for a responsibility (tort) model of contract
obligation, see Dalton, supra note 3, at 1042-65. See also supra note 20 (discussing defects in
will theory).
62 The will theory was considered empirical when courts and commentators, committed to the
principle of voluntarism and consensual exchange, see supra note 5, believed that they could
and should ascertain the free will of the parties. In part, the ease with which they decided free
will questions on empirical grounds depended on their disregard of actual disparities which
might have affected the freedom of the parties. See supra note 3.
' For a prime example of the view that distributional concerns are an important factor in
duress outcomes, see the discussion of Professor Dawson's article supra in the text accompanying
notes 21-26. But see infra note 162 (explaining why distributional motives do not completely
explain duress case law outcomes).
6 For a discussion of "moral" and "nonmoral" baselines, see A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2,
at 206-11. See also infra text accompanying notes 88-107.
Is See Fingarette, supra note 6, at 71-82 (discussing the inadequacy of overborne will theory
both as an explanation of case law results, and as a normative standard, and instead advocating
an approach based on fairness).
6Dalton, supra note 3, at 1027; Dawson, supra note 3, at 263; see, e.g., Rubenstein v.
Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, 372, 120 A.2d 11, 17 (1956) (in deciding the validity of a conveyance
attacked on duress grounds the court found a "prima facie showing here of a compulsive yielding
to the demand for the conveyances, rather than the volitional act of a free mind"); see also
cases cited supra note 20.
67See Fingarette, supra note 6, at 72; see also Rubenstein, 20 N.J. at 371, 120 A.2d at 16
(suggesting an analysis of duress based on psychological factors).
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abled," 68 and whether so much pressure has been applied as to impair
69
the victim's ability to choose rationally and to act willingly.

The test for duress based on the will theory illustrates the importance of autonomy principles in nineteenth-century contract law.7 °
The exception for agreements made in the absence of an assertion
of free will "seemed appropriate, even necessary, to nineteenth century
will theorists, who believed that enforcement of contracts was all
' 71
about implementing the free wills of the parties."

Courts deciding duress cases still rationalize the denial of enforcement by principles of consent. Thus, the test is whether the threat
has overborne a person's free will.7 2 Problems with the will theory,

however, undermine its usefulness as an appropriate standard for
deciding future cases.7 3 The will theory is defective because it is based
on a false central issue. It focuses on the "reality" of the victim's
consent.7 4 In fact, if one takes account of the real will of the party
in individual duress cases, one concludes that in most cases the victim
often eagerly and rationally chooses one option to avoid a less desirable
alternative.7 5 In these cases, there is no problem with "'volitional
Fingarette, supra note 6, at 72.

9 Id. at 75-76, 87-88.
70The

centrality of the autonomy principle in nineteenth-century contract law is undisputed.

See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 3, at 1012; Dawson, supra note 3, at 256 (discussing the introduction
of the concept of free will into economic duress analysis); Mensch, Freedom of Contract as
Ideology (Book Review), 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 758-59 (1981) (positing the voluntary exchange
of promises as one of the main tenets of the classical model of contract law); Metzger & Phillips,
supra note 3, at 475-78 (discussing the importance of individual freedom of will to classical
contract law). For a discussion of the changing role of the autonomy principle and its role in
contract law and jurisprudence, see supra note 5.
71Dalton, supra note 3, at 1027.
72See supra note 20.
71Cf. Barnett, supra note 1, at 285-86 (discussing the defects of normative standards).
74 Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 238; see also Dalton, supra note 3, at 1025 ("One approach
is to focus on the disfavored party, and ask whether that party's assent to the transaction was
genuine."). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts still focuses on the reality of assent. Section
175 comment c provides: "A party's manifestation of assent is induced by duress if the duress
substantially contributes to his decision to manifest his assent. . . . The test is subjective and
the question is, did the threat actually induce assent on the part of the person claiming to be
the victim of duress." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 comment c (1979).
75 "[lit is further plain that the more unpleasant the prospective alternative, the more genuine
is the consent to the contract necessary to escape that alternative; in other words, that the
consent to a contract resulting from duress is probably far more real than the typical contractual
consent." Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 240; see also Atiyah, supra note 20, at 200 (explaining
that "the more extreme the pressure, the more real is the consent of the victim"); Philips,
supra note 4, at 133-34 (1984) ("A coerced agent is presented with unwanted, unpleasant
alternatives, but is free to choose and to act upon the least obnoxious of them.").
[A] victim of coercion may deliberate and choose how to act, and may continuously act
intentionally and purposefully-as an intelligent agent of the coercer-in order to keep
conduct in accord with the current demands of the coercer. All this establishes in fact what
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capacity,' the kind of thing plainly suggested by the idiom of the
broken will. ' '76 In fact, when the victim "must choose between payment
and tragedy, [her] choice is certainly an expression of the most
' 77
genuine, heartfelt consent-and often a very happy consent indeed.
Thus, because the consent given may be very real, it is inappropriate
to decide cases on the basis of whether the agreement represents an
overborne or "destroyed" will. 78 The will theory focuses on an event,
the total destruction of the will, that is unlikely to occur except in
rare cases in which the victim becomes a "mere mechanical instrument. ' 79 Thus, the test is not likely to be useful in differentiating
valid from invalid agreements in the vast majority of cases.80
The will theory, moreover, is an inherently unworkable normative
standard for determining if a duress defense should succeed. First,
because "[w]e cannot directly know or ascertain the subjective intent
of the disfavored party"8' the approach is difficult to apply.8 2 Second,
the overborne will approach relegates decisionmaking on the grounds
of whether the "coercer's" behavior is somehow acceptable or unacceptable to underground status and thus deflects attention from
83
important policy matters.
The overborne will theory mistakenly assumes that parties to con4
tracts normally have unrestrained freedom and unlimited choice.
Yet, because freedom is a relative matter and "a will exercises its
freedom only in selecting one of several possible courses of action,"
is incompatible with the meaning of the legal concept of 'unwilled behavior.'
Fingarette, supra note 6, at 73-74.
76 Fingarette, supra note 6, at 75.
77 Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at
238.
78 Not only does the focus seem inappropriate because it fails to correspond with the reality
of the cases, but it is misguided as a normative standard because it neglects important policy
considerations. See infra Part III.
79RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 comment a (1979). For a discussion of such
nonvolitional acts, see A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9.
10See supra note 9 for examples of "biconditional" or "constrained" choices in which the
actor's will is real but her choice is nevertheless clearly coerced.
81Dalton, supra note 3, at 1025.
82 Professor Fingarette examines how focusing on the fairness of the choice might aid in
determining whether the choice was coerced. Fingarette, supra note 6, at 79-82.
Dalton, supra note 3, at 1025-32; see also supra note 20 (documenting defects in will theory).
Courts and commentators have been reluctant to accept the centrality of policy issues in
decisions regarding duress. According to Dalton, even Professor Dawson was reluctant to
"reformulate duress doctrine around the hitherto buried standard of bad behavior." Dalton,
supra note 3, at 1030. Instead, he focused on the impairment of bargaining power as a justification
for intervention, thereby "commit[ting] Dawson to replicating the underlying structure of the
formalist duress doctrine." Id. at 1031.
" Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 239.
85Id.
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an approach based on whether the agreement is the product of free
will or not, as alternative absolute choices, is not likely to yield
sensible results. If all choice is constrained in some way, 86 then a
duress approach based on absolute free will would make all contracts
voidable for duress. The free will theory is thus unable to distinguish
between enforceable and unenforceable agreements. The relevant question should be a normative one: Under what circumstances should
the agreement be enforced? When is a lack of choice available to
87
the promisor so compelling that enforcement should be withheld?
That normative decision should not be based on the elusive concept
of free will.'
2.

89
Normative Theories: 88 The "Moral Baseline" Approach

Defects in the will theory and its debunking in the literature 9
86Id.
87 According to Wertheimer, "[wie always choose from among a limited set of options.
Nonetheless, some sets of options are more constrained than others, and it is these relatively
highly constrained choice situations that I have in mind." A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at
10. The lack of any choice available to the promisor (coercee) emphasizes the need for promisee
(coercer) to exercise restraint. Another approach would focus on whether the promisee (the
coercer) has a property right in the threatened alternative. That property right question would
be solved by reference to social objectives such as identifying and enforcing property rights in
order to foster optimal allocation of resources to production. See Conybeare, The Private and
Social Utility of Extortion, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 1028, 1029-30 (1981) (examining the use of social
objectives to determine the legality of acts of extortion); Demsetz, On Extortion: A Reply, 68
AM. EcoN. REv. 417, 418 (1978) (examining the social utility of "wealth transfer" and focusing
on the legal system's method of "alter[ing] the definition of property rights").
8 Professor Barnett would classify normative or standards-based theories as "those which
evaluate the substance of a contractual transaction to see if it conforms to a standard of
evaluation that the theory specifies as primary." Barnett, supra note 1, at 277. Because the
approach to duress based on normative standards "embod[ies] an assumption that we can
distinguish the acceptable from the unacceptable; the attempt to make this distinction throws
us directly into the problem of power[:] . . . the power of the state to control private arrangements
and to evaluate private power relations." Dalton, supra note 3, at 1025-26. The reluctance to
admit a public role in private contractual arrangement derives from a continued attachment to
the notion that courts can act as value-neutral facilitators of the choices of private parties,
thereby protecting the "vaunted neutrality of the state as enforcer of the will of the parties."
Id. at 1029. The reluctance to admit a public role for contract law has prompted commentators
and courts to manufacture a variety of techniques designed to suppress the public aspect of
duress. See, e.g., id. at 1026-27; Gordon, Historicism, supra note 31, at 1024-25 (describing
systems of legal thought in which "denial that particular contexts of time and place are relevant
to the enterprise of legal rationalization" (emphasis removed)). All legal rules are in some sense
government interventions and therefore can be considered "public." Simply providing a claim
for damages for breach of an express contract would be a "public" act in this context.
Other normative theories for deciding duress claims not discussed in the text include Professor
Mather's "matrix for harmful modifications." Mather, supra note 3, at 632. Mather's framework
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prompted some commentators to offer a second theory of coercionone based on normative standards. Morality-based theory permits the
substantive review of an agreement to determine whether it comports
with relevant moral or societal norms of fairness and cooperation. 91
If the agreement does not satisfy such standards, then it should be
voidable for duress.
The morality-based approach to differentiating coercive from noncoercive proposals defines coercion as a worsening of the victim's
position when measured against some baseline or other frame of
reference. 92 As Professor Wertheimer explains, "A makes a threat
when, if B does not accept A's proposal, B will be worse off than in
the relevant baseline position. '93 The appropriate question to ask
under a moral baseline standard 94 is whether the threat "is a condoes not provide a wholly satisfactory approach. First, Professor Mather's discussion of the
"sympathetic amendment" identifies a reduction in social gain from the amount anticipated as
a reason to make a buyer share the seller's anticipated loss without providing a justification
for that loss sharing. Id. at 632-34. Although a seller's reduced profit may be troubling, it is
not clear why that fact alone justifies the buyer in bearing that cost "to relieve [the] [s]eller
from bearing the entire burden." Id. at 633. Second, in some ways the test would be overly
restrictive in judging the propriety of amendments. Mather would reject as coercive what he
calls a "holdup amendment," id. at 636-37, ignoring the hidden costs to society of nonenforcement.
Because the suggested amendment may not be palpably unfair, it may be costly to alert potential
coercers to the involuntariness of the transaction. See infra text accompanying notes 162-99.
"A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 206-11 (describing "moral"and "nonmoral" baselines as
defined by Nozick, supra note 8, at 440).
90See Atiyah, supra note 20; Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4; Dawson, supra note 3.
" See Feinman, CriticalApproaches, supra note 5, at 843.
92See Westen, supra note 2, at 573 (finding a particular "proposal can thus be characterized
accurately as either a threat or an offer, depending on which baseline one stipulates"). Baselines
help to bring meaning to the distinction between offers of rewards, which are often regarded
as noncoercive, and threats of burdens, which are deemed coercive. Id. at 571-72. Unless we
are to regard these terms as merely "semantic," id. at 574 n.107 (citing Farnsworth, Coercion
in Contract Law, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 329, 332-33 (1982)), one must decide on a
baseline against which to measure the proposal; otherwise, one will not be able to decide whether
it threatens the victim with a penalty or offers the recipient a reward. Id. at 572.
11A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 204. If duress is conceptualized in this way, then proposals
in the form of amendments to improve the recipient's position are not coercive even if refusal
of the offer would leave the recipient in a worse position: "If the amendment makes B better
off than the original terms, not merely as well off, her assent to the amendment has obviously
not been coerced because it was not the result of the threat." Mather, supra note 3, at 625
n.34.
94 Commentators have suggested standards other than a moral standard to establish baselines.
For example, Wertheimer describes a predictive, or statistical test, A. WERTHEIMER, supra note
2, at 207-211, and Westen describes a preference standard. Westen, supra note 2, at 577-78.
The predictive test measures proposals against "what is 'normal' in . . . society." A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 207. If the proposal would make the recipient better off than would
otherwise normally be the case based on predictions about how people are likely to act, a court
would find no coercion. Id. The preference standard looks at what the recipient of the proposal
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ditional promise to leave the recipient worse off than he ought to be
left under the circumstances." 95
The moral baseline theory suffers from defects that inhere in any
normative standard.96 One major obstacle to consistent application of
this theory is that agreement on the standards for judging the morality
of a proposal may be impossible to reach. 97 Such a determination
depends entirely on where one sets the baseline against which the
acceptability of the threat is to be measured. 98 Moreover, because
there are many possible baselines and because moral baseline theory
does not itself resolve where to set the baseline, many results seem
plausible, although not compelled. Results in duress cases appear
certain only when the baseline is indisputable.
Wertheimer and others contrast the following two examples to
highlight the fact that the application of an indisputable concept of
moral obligation invites divergent results. In the first example, "A
realizes that B is about to lose a large sum in the stock market. A
tells B that he will help B avoid the loss if and only if B gives him
15 percent of the amount he would have lost." 99 In the second example,
"A comes upon an auto wreck and an injured B on a desolate stretch
of road. A tells B that he will call an ambulance if and only if B
gives him $100."100 According to the analysis of several commentators,
coercion does not exist in the stockmarket case because A is not
required under a moral baseline approach to render his services for
free.' 0 ' Moral obligations, however, obligate A to call an ambulance,
wanted. If the proposal violates that preference, it is coercive. Westen, supra note 2, at 57778.
The interplay of all three baselines-moral, predictive, and preference-can be seen in the
slave case example drawn by Professor Nozick. Nozick, supra note 8, at 450-51. If a slaveholder
who regularly whips his slave, makes a proposal to stop whipping the slave if he will work for
the owner on Sunday, but to continue whipping him if he does not work on Sunday, the
propriety of the threat will be different when measured under the various baselines. See A.
WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 208-09. Under the predictive test, the slave expects regular
beatings, and the proposal does not make the slave worse off than under an expected reality,
and thus the proposal is an offer. Id. at 208. Under both the moral and preference baselines,
the offer would be coercive. Under the moral baseline, since "[hie ought to occupy a position
in which he is not regularly whipped for the sport of it . . . the slaveholder is conditionally
promising to leave [the slave] decidedly worse off." Westen, supra note 2, at 583-84. Under a
preference test the proposal would be coercive for a slave who preferred not to be whipped and
to maintain a Sunday holiday.
95Westen, supra note 2, at 576.
1 Barnett, supra note 1, at 285-86.
97 Id.

98See infra text accompanying notes 99-107.
A. WERTHEIMER,

supra note 2, at 214 (providing an example drawn from Gunderson, Threats

and Coercion, 9 CAN. J. PHIL., 247, 258 (1979)).
00

1

Id.

1oId. at 214-15 (discussing the views of Gunderson and Haksar).
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thereby making his threat not to do so unless he is paid $100
wrongful. 12 In these examples, the boundaries of conduct required
under moral obligation theory seem self-evident.
In other cases, however, the morality of the proposal is not as
obvious. Morality is not a universal and self-evident concept but a
debatable one susceptible to numerous subjective interpretations.
Therefore, it is impossible to set a universally acceptable moral
baseline against which to measure the coerciveness of a proposal;
hence, the theory is inadequate as a vehicle for deciding cases. The
problem of a multiplicity of moral baselines is illustrated by the
following example, given by Professor Nozick. "A is B's normal
supplier of illegal drugs for $20 per day. One day, A proposes to B
that he will supply B's drugs if and only if B beats up C."'' 3 Nozick
finds A's proposal to be noncoercive because he concludes that moral
obligation does not require A to be a drug supplier for B.10 4 But
Wertheimer proposes that the analysis is "murkier" than at first
appears if one admits that it is possible to find some moral obligation
that would require A to continue to act as B's supplier. 10 5
Because moral issues often present a murky quagmire, 10 6 agreement
on the propriety of a threat measured by a moral baseline may be
difficult. 10 7 To resolve ambiguities on the moral issue, courts and
commentators should focus on the societal consequences of finding
102
Id.

at 209 (providing an example drawn from Nozick, supra note 8,at 447).
Nozick, supra note 8, at 447-48, 450-51; see A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 209
(interpreting Nozick's view).
10 A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 209 & n.27 (suggesting the possibility that "[elven if
the drug relationship is immoral from an external perspective, it is arguable that within that
relationship, A is morally required to continue to supply B with drugs"); see also Frankfurt,
supra note 9, at 72 (discussing the relevance of a prior course of dealings in determining if a
proposal is coercive or noncoercive).
100See, e.g., A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 229-33. Professor Wertheimer's discussion of
the Lecherous Millionaire example, which is drawn from Feinberg, Noncoercive Exploitation, in
PATERNALISM 208 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983), illustrates the deficiencies of a moral baseline analysis.
In the example the millionaire offers a mother money to cover medical expenses to save her
dying child if she will become the millionaire's mistress. A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 229.
If the rights-based (moral) baseline is accepted, then one would find the proposal to be noncoercive
since the millionaire is not obligated to help. Id. at 231. An alternative analysis that focuses
on the policy consequences of granting or denying relief should be factored into the debate on
duress claims. Under this policy-based analysis, it may be that the societal consequence of
denying the duress claim would be undesirable. A waste of resources might result if millionaires
seek out desperate mothers secure in the expectation that courts will not void their contracts.
See Daly & Giertz, Externalities,Extortion, and Efficiency, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 997, 1001 (1975)
("[E]xtortion [could be] an extremely expensive method of allocating and distributing resources.");
see also R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 174-76 (discussing the economics of rescue).
'o7See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 53 (asserting that the test for duress based on the
propriety of a threat is "moralized").
103Id.
"o'
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duress. Otherwise, the dilemma will remain unsolved, with each side
arguing that its position is morally compelled. Focusing on labeling
the proposal as violative of some abstract moral baseline is unproductive because it diverts attention from what the result should be
in light of underlying policy concerns.
C. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts Doctrinal Approach
The main current doctrinal standard for deciding duress claims in
contract cases-the Restatement (Second) of Contracts-provides no
better guidance than the theoretical approaches explored in Part II.
The Restatement tests are so ambiguous as to be almost meaningless
and therefore easily manipulable by courts.
The first prong of the Restatement's contract duress defense is
partly normative. Section 175(1) would render a contract voidable by
the victim if the "manifestation of assent is induced by an improper
threat."'' 0 Section 176 of the Restatement goes on to define improper
threat:
(1) A threat is improper if
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself
would be a crime or a tort if it resulted in obtaining property,
(b) what is threatened is a criminal prosecution,
(c) what is threatened is the use of civil process and the
threat is made in bad faith, or
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing under a contract with the recipient.
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair
terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would
not significantly benefit the party making the threat,
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation
of assent is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the
party making the threat, or
'o

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979).

The full text of § 175 reads as

follows:
(1) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other
party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.
(2) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by one who is not a party to the transaction,
the contract is voidable by the victim unless the other party to the transaction in good
faith and without reason to know of the duress either gives value or relies materially on
the transaction.
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(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.' °9
Thus, even if it is neither criminal nor tortious, the threat may
still be improper if it "is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing under a contract," 110 or if, as a result of the threat, there is
an "unfair exchange" and there has been either "prior unfair dealing"
or "a use of power for illegitimate ends.""' The standards for interpreting the impropriety of the threat are open-ended standards characteristic of modern contract law." 2 Ultimately, these guidelines for
judging improper threats fail to provide a satisfactory solution because
they sidestep the very questions they raise. As Professor Dalton
queries, "What uses of power are illegitimate, what kinds of pressure
are unfair, in the contractual context?"113 The Restatement itself does
not provide clearly articulated standards for determining when an
exchange is unfair or when there is unfair dealing.' 14 Consequently,
courts manipulate these standards according to their own views of
fairness in the particular case." 5
The second prong of the doctrinal duress analysis also fails to
provide adequate guidance to decisionmakers and suffers from the
same open-endedness as the threat element. Section 175(1) turns on
whether the party subjected to an improper threat had a "reasonable
6
alternative" to acquiesence in the threatening party's proposal.1
Normative elements necessarily inhere in the determination of whether
a given alternative course of action is reasonable or not.'1 7 Courts

manipulate this reasonableness criterion, sometimes holding for example, that an available legal remedy, even if costly to the threatened
party, is necessarily a reasonable alternative. At other times, courts
dispense altogether with requiring the inability to resort to the law
as a condition for a successful duress claim."' Courts also manipulate
-- Id. § 176.
"°Id. § 176(1)(d).
" Id.§ 176(2)(b)-(c).
112 Moreover, as Professor Dalton states, "These [standards]
raise the very questions they
were supposed to answer." Dalton, supra note 3, at 1035.
Id.

113

114See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

176 comments a-f (1979) (providing no
definition for "unfair exchange" or "unfair dealing"). But see id. comment f (giving examples
and commentary on these issues).
115
See supra note 22.
116
See supra note 108.
1,7
The normative element is reflected in "[t]he 'objectivity' of the 'reasonable alternatives'
standard." Dalton, supra note 3, at 1033.
118
Court manipulation of the reasonable alternative prong of duress doctrine can be seen by
examining case law. Compare London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr.
262 (1965) (plaintiff voluntarily chose not to pursue a civil suit for damages and therefore a
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the degree to which economic hardship may entitle a claimant to
accede to the threat and forgo a financially ruinous alternative." 9
III.

A SUGGESTED POLICY GUIDE FOR DECIDING DURESS CASES

Because of the ambiguous and open-ended nature of doctrinal tests,
courts inevitably encounter difficulties in applying them in a predictable and consistent fashion. This Article suggests that the courts
should look to other, more clearly articulated, policies to assist them
in deciding duress claims. Clarifying these policies will clarify application of the elements of duress.
A.

Efficiency Concerns in the Duress Context

An efficiency policy should be incorporated into the traditional
doctrinal duress analysis. An efficiency standard normally seeks to
evaluate various rules of law to determine if they permit individuals
to maximize their individual welfare, and to make both parties to a
transaction "better off.' 20 An efficiency policy based on judicial economy,1 21 efficient prevention of resource misallocation,122 and/or efficient
claim of duress was inappropriate) and King Enters. v. Manchester Water Works, 122 N.H.
1011, 1015, 453 A.2d 1276, 1278 (1982) (plaintiffs claim that settlement was coerced by city
water authority failed where plaintiff opted not to continue to pursue his legal remedy) with
Adams v. Schiffer, 11 Colo. 15, 17 P. 21 (1888) (court did not discuss pursuit of civil relief in
deciding a duress claim), noted in Dalzell, Duress II, supra note 40, at 341-42 and S.S. & 0.
Corp. v. Township of Bernards Sewerage Auth., 62 N.J. 369, 301 A.2d 738 (1973) (plaintiff
permitted to prevail on a duress claim despite a failure to challenge the improper action of the
coercer in court before acquiescing); see also cases cited supra note 40; Dalton, supra note 3,
at 1033 n.126 & 1033-34 (discussing "the manipulability of the reasonable alternative standard").
"' See cases cited supra note 118.
120Economists

conclude that welfare maximization for individuals will result in an aggregate

increase in welfare for society as a whole. See, e.g., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF CONTRACT LAW 1-2 (1979); Cooter & Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF.

L. REV. 1432, 1460-61, 1463-64 (1985). This Article focuses on efficiency not only at the microindividualized level, but also seeks to evaluate at the macro level whether certain results will
be efficient in terms of saving judicial resources or expenses. These latter concerns do not fit
neatly within the private welfare model.
This Article goes beyond the two private parties to the exchange to promote the general
social welfare. Thus, the test for the efficient allocation of judicial resources in the context of
contractual duress, see infra text accompanying notes 126-46, should be considered part of a
broader efficiency test. Although conservation of judicial resources is a pressing issue at the
local level, it is rooted in broader economic policies. See infra note 127.
121 See infra text accompanying notes 126-61.
122See

infra text accompanying notes 162-248.
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normative case outcomes,1 13 would provide a supplemental means of
deciding duress claims. In addition, incorporation of efficiency policy
concerns into duress analysis would provide a theoretical underpinning
for the cases, explain and organize results, 2 4 and thereby increase
predictability in cases when doctrinal applications are otherwise un25

certain. 1

1. The Case for Explicit Consideration of the Judicial Economy
Factor: A Useful Analysis When Doctrinal Ambiguities Exist
a. Judicial Economy as an Efficiency Concern
Courts should be reluctant to find duress if the result would produce
needless delay and a waste of judicial resources. Judicial resources
are wasted if a finding of duress will only prompt further actions in
which the winner of the duress claim will inevitably lose on the
ultimate substantive issue. The pattern of waste could occur in one
of two ways. A prevailing duress claimant may prompt the coercer
to institute a second action to vindicate her substantive rights. Alternatively, the coercer may be able to vindicate her rights by taking
unilateral action that will disadvantage the duress claimant. In either
case, a finding of duress may promote a waste of judicial resources.
If the duress victory prompts a second lawsuit by the coercer, and
the duress claimant has a losing substantive claim, the duress finding
will only temporarily advantage a party who will lose in the second
lawsuit. A duress finding merely postpones loss by the duress claimant
until the defeat on the merits in the second lawsuit. Thus, if a
contract required B to furnish particular goods to A, a general contractor, and if B refused to furnish those goods and did not agree to
do so until A threatened to exercise its legal remedies (including
hiring another party to do the work and charging B with the costs),
123

See infra text accompanying notes 250-80.

24An efficiency theory can explain otherwise inexplicable variations in the case law and in

this sense "seeks a scientific explanation for the welter of legal microdata, an explanation in
the compound form of (1) a descriptive law that can order the data, organize them into an
elegant, trenchant, parsimonious macropattern, and impart to them an 'implicit logic."' Michelman, supra note 58, at 1035.
325 For examples illustrating the potential of an efficiency theory to resolve the outcome of a
case whose resolution would be uncertain under a strict doctrinal analysis, see infra text
accompanying notes 138-46.
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B's claim of duress should be rejected. 126 If the court found duress,
then A would be prompted to institute a suit to compel B to furnish
the product required under the contract. A finding of duress would
thus only temporarily advantage B and prompt a second wasteful
127
lawsuit.
A waste of judicial resources can also occur in situations in which
the coercer may, despite a finding of duress, exercise unilateral power
to vindicate her rights, thus rendering a judicial finding in the duress
claimant's favor wasteful. Assume that an employer gives an employee
at will the option of being fired or accepting a favorable severance
package. The employee acquiesces in the severance pay and then
challenges the agreement on duress grounds and seeks reinstatement. 28 If the court voids the agreement on duress grounds, then the
29
employer may simply exercise its right to terminate the employee.
Thus, by a duress finding, the employee gains no more than temporary
126 This hypothetical is based on W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896
(8th Cir. 1957).
127 Although this hypothetical may be explained in terms of the wrongful act prong of the

Restatement (most would agree that it is not wrongful to threaten to resort to one's legal
remedies in order to pressure a non-performing party), the wrongfulness analysis may have
limited usefulness in situations where agreed upon norms do not automatically resolve the
wrongfulness issue. In these instances efficiency analysis may be useful.
In its simplest form, efficiency focuses on achieving the greatest output with the least input.
The conservation of judicial resources is a particularized, narrow type of efficiency that ties

into broader economic justifications for duress.
For example, imagine that A owes B money (the "associated claim"). Later, in response to
a threat by B, A agrees to pay B the money owed (the "subsequent settlement deal"). If an
inquiry into the merits of the associated claim reveals that the duress claimant has a losing
claim and that the threatener would likely win, the duress claim should be denied. In this
circumstance, any expenditure of resources by the threatener, including the resources devoted
to the threat, will most likely be worth the present value of winning. On the other hand, if
the duress claimant is likely to win on the associated claim, then any expenditure of resources
by the threatener, including the resources devoted to the threat, will likely exceed the present
value of winning. Thus, the threat is likely to have a negative value for the threatener. Courts
should find duress in such cases. The economic justifications for duress can be viewed as part
of the general economic justification for this type of result.
When the threatener has a losing associated claim, the threat is arguably of "no benefit to
the actor" in terms of "individual private utility," Conybeare, supra note 87, at 1029, and
therefore the threat is extortionate. Extortion involves "an act which merely redistributes income
and reduces social welfare by the amount of any transaction costs." Id. at 1028. Thus, judicial
resources should be expended to undo such transactions. This would prevent the allocation of
resources to such negative transactions.
- This hypothetical is based on Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987), although in that case the employee did not seek reinstatement.
,29For a discussion of the traditional rule granting an employer the right to discharge employees
at will unless the contract expressly provides for a specific duration, as well as an exploration
of judicially created limitations on this doctrine, see Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At- Will
Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323
(1986).
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relief that will be eliminated once the employer exercises its termination rights. If the employer should subsequently fire the employee
and the employee challenges the termination, the court would undoubtedly uphold the termination. 130 Thus, deciding the duress claim
in favor of the employee initially would only buy time. Given the
scarcity of judicial resources, it is wasteful to utilize them in this
fashion.
Of course, all settlements result in judicial economies. Because
settlements avoid the necessity of judicial intervention on a disputed
issue, they are favored creatures of the law.131 The judicial economy
suggested here is, however, different from that normally applicable
with compromise agreements. In an ordinary compromise, judicial
economy suggests that the agreement not be upset because of the
judicial expenditure that would be entailed in doing so. This judicial
economy is thought to override individual dissatisfaction with the
settlement. The judicial economy identified here is even more compelling. It suggests that settlements not be overturned when there is
no chance that the party claiming relief ultimately will prevail. No
compelling reason exists to upset the settlement because the claimant
would ultimately lose on the merits. This may not be the case, however,
when avoidance of the agreement will enable the allegedly coerced
party to advance a winning claim.
b.

Application and Explanation

Even if the judicial economy explanation is fortuitously consistent
with case law results, the question of whether the approach is more
useful than traditional doctrinal analysis or should merely be used
to supplement such analysis remains open. In the two hypotheticals
discussed above, the Restatement's doctrinal approach would inquire
into whether the threat to resort to legal remedies or the threat of
130If there is no second lawsuit because the employee does not challenge the later termination,
then one might legitimately inquire how one decision (no duress) conserves judicial resources
more than another decision (duress) when judicial resources are used to decide only one case.
Even in that instance, a finding of no duress could conserve judicial resources and be preferable
to a finding of duress because it might discourage future lawsuits by similarly situated employees.
131See, e.g., Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) (denying
duress claim by citing "[t]he adverse effect on the finality of settlements and hence on the
willingness of parties to settle their contract disputes without litigation" if settlements were
voidable on the ground that one party had been financially desparate when the settlement was
made); London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 241, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262, 267 (1965)
("If the courts should begin to encourage suits like this one, land deals would never be final
in this country.").
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immediate firing was improper. 132 Because there may be general agreement that these threats are not wrongful, the cases seem easy to
resolve under the traditional wrongfulness rubric because conventional
doctrine states that it is not duress to threaten to do what one has
a legal right to do. 133 Moreover, the employment hypothetical is a
34
relatively simple case to resolve under a moral baseline approach.1
The employee is not entitled to continue in his employment at all;
therefore, one could characterize the proposal for resignation with
severance benefits as an offer rather than a coercive proposal. The
proposal makes the employee "better off" than she would be if
terminated with the possibility of not recovering any severence benefits, and is therefore a noncoercive offer.' 35 This would be true even
if the employee preferred to continue on and receive her regular
wages. Thus, a strict doctrinal analysis based either on wrongfulness
or on a moral baseline seems adequate.
Nevertheless, the judicial economy approach may prove useful in
cases in which the doctrinal element of wrongfulness is not easy to
apply and thus subject to manipulation. 136 Furthermore, the approach
132See

supra note 38 (discussing the improper threat element).
see supra note 52.
14 See supra note 92.
"I See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 215.
13'The manipulability of the reasonable alternative prong of duress doctrine has already been
addressed in supra notes 40 and 118. The manipulability of the wrongfulness component is
evidenced by comparing the following cases; in each, the employer offered the employee a choice
between two unpalatable alternatives. Although all the employers had a legal right to fire the
employees, the courts reached differing conclusions as to whether the threat to terminate made
the resulting agreement voidable for duress. Compare Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co.,
435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970) (threat to terminate employees at will if they did not agree to
sell their stock to company officers deemed actionable on the issue of duress) and Wise v.
Midtown Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404 (1950) (threat to cause discharge of former
employee from present employment and use of legal process to ruin him unless he released
claim against former employer permits inference of duress) and McCubbin v. Buss, 180 Neb.
624, 144 N.W.2d 175 (1966) (threat to discharge employee if he did not agree to cancel stock
purchase contract deemed wrongful and cancellation agreement may be rescinded) with Schmalz
v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (not wrongful for employer to offer
employee choice of resignation with reduced severance or termination) and Fox v. Piercey, 119
Utah 367, 227 P.2d 763 (1951) (not wrongful for employer to offer fireman option of resignation
or termination).
Some commentators have explained the variability in the case law results in terms of the
presence of a threat made to extract a collateral benefit for the employer. See E.A. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 6, § 4.17, at 261-62. Others would explain them in terms of an unjust benefit to
the employer. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 282-88. This Article suggests that the variability
in results may be explained in terms of efficiency. Efficiency policy concerns provide an
explanation for these results that may be easier to apply than the slippery concepts of unjust
enrichment or collateral benefits. The usefulness of the tests suggested here in resolving a wide
range of factual situations, and the societal benefits in terms of conservation of judicial resources,
prevention of resource misallocation, and encouragement of appropriate economic incentives,
133But

1989]

Duress Policy Guide

may enhance predictability when the coercer's action does not fall
within the ambit of specifically protected contractual rights, but also
does not explicitly violate tort or criminal law standards. The Restatement tests for judging wrongfulness in the noncriminal/nontort
context are based on normative ideas of unfair exchange and the
illegitimate use of power. But they do not directly resolve how the
issues of fairness and legitimacy should be solved.' 37 In a case in
which the "wrongfulness" of the action is problematic, the judicial
economy analysis can facilitate appropriate case outcomes.
Finserv Computer Corp. v. Bibliographic Retrieval Services13s illustrates a case in which ambiguities concerning the "wrongfulness" of
the coercer's actions should be supplemented by an efficient judicial
resource allocation analysis. In Finserv, the defendant executed an
agreement that "provided compensation to plaintiff for its assistance
in the founding and financing of defendant."' 39 The contract was
entered into after the plaintiff had threatened to interfere with the
defendant's funding arrangements and threatened to sully its president's reputation by calling him a "welcher."' 140 When defendant
refused to honor the agreement, plaintiff sued.141
Finserv is a case in which the wrongfulness component of doctrinal
duress analysis may be difficult to apply. Standing alone, the threats
do not fit into predefined categories of tort or crime. Normative and
suggest the adoption of efficiency policy guides in duress analysis. Duress avoidance may be
available because such a result will increase efficiency. For example, in the McCubbin case, the
duress avoidance may be available to encourage the disclosure of certain information in order
that parties may bargain for mutual benefit. The employer who utilized the pressure of terminating
the employee's job should have a duty to disclose that such pressure would be used before prior
to the plaintiffs purchase of his stock because it would have affected the value of the stock
purchase. Having failed to disclose that information, the employer should be prohibited from
using the tactic. A duress finding will thus penalize the employer for failing to disclose the
potential use of such tactics and encourage the disclosure of unexpected and collateral pressures
so that bargaining to mutual advantage can occur.
The employment cases provide good examples of situations in which the employer threatens
to do that which he has a legal right to do: terminate an employee at will. Nevertheless, courts
sometimes find the threat to be wrongful. Similarly, threating to sue in order to induce an
agreement when the maker of the threat lacks a good faith basis for believing he has a cause
of action is the type of bad faith that will make an agreement voidable. See A. WERTHEIMER,
supra note 2, at 42.
I" The ease of deciding cases involving a threat that is not independently wrongful is as
mythical as the theoretical ease of deciding contract formation cases according to doctrinal
tests. See Gordon, Historicism, supra note 31, at 1025-26; see also supra text accompanying
note 112.
1- 125 A.D.2d 765, 509 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1986).
'39Id. at 766, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
140Id.
"I Id. at 765, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 188. The duress claim was raised by way of an affirmative
defense. Id.
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moral baseline approaches are difficult to apply to Finserv because
of the difficulty of ascertaining whether the threat to call someone
a welcher in these circumstances is morally objectionable or legally
42
wrongful.
Nonetheless, even if Finserv is difficult to decide under the wrongfulness element or moral baseline theories, the court should find no
duress on judicial economy grounds. Finding duress would only temporarily benefit the defendant and thus waste judicial resources. If
the court granted the duress claim, the defendant could void the
coerced agreement to pay the plaintiff.143 The defendant, however,
would still owe the plaintiff for services rendered and presumably the
plaintiff could still recover on a quantum meruit or other related
theory. 144 Thus, denying the duress claim avoids the waste of judicial
resources entailed in granting the defendant a victory which would
subsequently be overturned in an action by the plaintiff to recover
45
the amount owed.
In addition to providing a new approach for deciding cases, judicial
efficiency helps to explain a pattern of cases in which courts have
refused to find duress when the claimant clearly had a losing case
on the merits.146 Courts may refuse to find duress as a way of
42 See

supra text accompanying notes 96-107.
See supra note 6 (discussing the right to avoid agreements entered into under duress).
144For a discussion of the circumstances under which restitution would be available as an
alternative basis of recovery, see E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 2.20, at 98-104.
145 Other cases in which the judicial economy analysis might prove useful include Enslen v.
Village of Lombard, 128 Ill. App. 3d 531, 470 N.E.2d 1188 (1984) (even if the court were to
find a resignation voidable for duress, the city still might be able to terminate employee); Beznos
v. Martin, 22 Mich. App. 376, 177 N.W.2d 226 (1970) (even if a finding of duress would entitle
plaintiff to recover $1,500 paid for the reconveyance, the claimant would still owe defendants
money for land defendants reconveyed to plaintiff); King Enters. v. Manchester Water Works,
122 N.H. 1011, 453 A.2d 1276 (1982) (even if the court voids the agreement requiring the
developer to pay for water connections, the duress claimant would lose a subsequent lawsuit
since no court would permit a developer to obtain water connections for free); Grad v. Roberts,
14 N.Y.2d 70, 198 N.E.2d 26, 248 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1964) (even if a note for $5,000 and payment
of $10,000 were voidable for duress, the underlying contractual obligation would still entitle the
alleged coercer to a subsequent trial if the plaintiff refused to pay this amount as per the terms
of the contract).
4 W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896, 902, 904 (8th Cir. 1957) (when
a subcontractor was previously obligated by contract to furnish window sills, the court found
no duress in a second agreement to do the work); City of Chicago v. American Nat. Bank &
Trust Co., 146 Ill. App. 3d 784, 497 N.E.2d 413 (1986) (when a property owner challenged an
agreement for compensation for condemned land on duress grounds, duress was not available
because the city acted within its rights to institute condemnation proceedings); Schmalz v.
Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (employee who had no legal basis on
which to resist termination lost on a duress claim); First Data Resources, Inc. v. Omaha Steaks
Int'l, Inc., 209 Neb. 327, 307 N.W.2d 790 (1981) (when a claimant alleged duress in agreeing
to a price increase, duress was unavailable because the alleged coercer had a contractual right
143
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discouraging parties from pursuing meritless substantive claims under
the guise of a duress action. In part this may be explained as an
effort to conserve scarce judicial resources. Courts may weigh the
relative costs of a lawsuit on the substantive claim against the costs
of a lawsuit on the duress claim. Because duress claims involve
complex determinations of a threat's wrongfulness, as well as of the
reasonableness of the alternatives, courts may try to discourage duress
claims when the duress claimant would not prevail on the underlying
to terminate the agreement to provide services if assent to the price increase was withheld);
Waara v. Kane, 269 N.W.2d 395 (S.D. 1978) (lessee argued duress in agreeing to a rental increase
at renewal; but had lessee attempted to challenge the rate increase, he would have lost on the
merits since presumably on expiration of the lease, city could charge whatever it wanted);
Crocker v. Schneider, 683 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (party alleging duress to
avoid a contract had a losing claim because the other party had a "right to insist" on reducing
the joint venture agreement to writing as a condition for plaintiff's withdrawal from a HUD
application); Simpson v. MBank Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (when bank
did not have to agree to restructure a debt to facilitate sale of business, seller who was required
to execute personal guarantees could not complain of duress).
Alternatively, if the claimant clearly has a substantially meritorious claim that she forsakes
under a coerced "agreement," the courts more readily entertain claims of duress. Leeper v.
Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959) (agreement to satisfy a mortgagee's
false claim on property in order to lift a cloud on title of property is voidable for duress if
raised within the statute of limitations); Scutti v. State Rd. Dep't, 220 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (claimant who entered into a waiver agreement in order to obtain an
occupancy permit that had been wrongfully denied prevailed on a duress claim); Wise v. Midtown
Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404 (1950) (employee suing employer for compensation
for services rendered was entitled to rescind a settlement agreed to under duress); S.S. & 0.
Corp. v. Township of Bernards Sewerage Auth., 62 N.J. 369, 301 A.2d 738 (1973) (a duress
claim was available to a customer who agreed to pay sewer connection assessments when charges
were discriminatory in violation of statute). Nevertheless, the presence of a winning claim does
not guarantee that the plaintiff will prevail on duress. The court may deny relief where the
plaintiff had "reasonable alternatives" to the coerced agreement and failed to pursue them. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 comment b (1979).
One explanation for the fact that results in duress cases are often linked to the merits of
the victim's substantive claim focuses on judicial economy concerns. If the duress claimant
would clearly have lost anyway on the merits, courts should discourage the claimant from
pursuing a duress claim. Because claimants will inevitably lose on the merits, they will often
decline to pursue these claims and thereby save the courts from wasting limited resources on
losing claims.
Another unarticulated policy concern, which might help to explain why courts are reluctant
to let plaintiffs win on a duress claim when they could not win on the merits, is a policy
against wild card results. If duress claimants could routinely prevail in cases that they would
lose on the merits, then duress claims would pose a challenge to the body. of substantive law
governing the transaction.
Why, then, do parties with meritorious substantive claims prevail more frequently on duress
issues? Arguably, judicial economy concerns dictate that the settlement should always be accorded
finality and that no party should be able to upset a settlement, even on duress grounds.
Nonetheless, a policy of always denying duress relief to parties with valid substantive claims
would promote other kinds of inefficiency. Parties who could get a party with a winning claim
to make an enforceable concession might overvalue the benefit of such contracts, falsely secure
in the hope that they could capitalize on others' economic straits. That result would promote
a misallocation of resources.
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substantive issues. Encouraging a trial whose outcome is relatively
certain rather than a duress action in which the issues are murkier
and less well defined helps to conserve judicial resources. By foreclosing parties from bringing duress claims, courts relegate parties to
an initial pursuit of the claims on the merits. Because they stand to
lose at that stage, parties will keep such losing cases out of court,
thereby saving the court's needed resources for more meritorious
cases.

c. How Courts Go Wrong in Failing to Incorporate Judicial
Economy Analysis
A court may reach inappropriate results by failing to incorporate
the judicial economy policy outlined here and continuing to rely
147
exclusively on the Restatement's doctrinal tests. Beznos v. Martin
illustrates a case in which judicial economy analysis might have proved
useful because strict doctrinal analysis, applied in isolation, yielded
undesirable consequences. In Beznos, the plaintiff owned two adjacent
lots, one with a house and one without. While negotiating for the
sale of the house (on lot 1), the plaintiff sold off the vacant lot (lot
2). When the purchaser of the vacant lot discovered that the driveway
to the house on lot 1 encroached on his property, he threatened to
destroy it unless the original owner, the plaintiff in this case, gave
him $1,500.148 The plaintiff agreed to pay that amount in return for
a deed to the driveway, but later argued that the money had been
extorted under duress.149 Without a deed to the entire driveway, the
plaintiff would have been unable to sell lot 1 with the house. Thus,
arguably, the plaintiff had no choice but to acquiesce in the demand. 50 The court's analysis focused on the plaintiff's duress claim
and whether the transaction was "voluntary.'' 1 l The court found
enough facts to raise an issue of duress. 152
Because it is so amorphous and manipulable, the voluntariness
theory cannot resolve the duress claim. Even under the Restatement
14722

Mich. App. 376, 177 N.W.2d 226 (1970).

"I Id. at 377-78, 177 N.W.2d at 227.
49

1

Id.

at 378, 177 N.W.2d at 227.

1WIt was not literally true that the vendor had no choice; however, the choice of jeopardizing

the house sale was unpalatable. See supra note 9 (discussing the concept of "constrained"
choices).
151Beznos, 22 Mich. App. at 378-79, 177 N.W.2d at 227.
15'
Id. at 379, 177 N.W.2d at 227-28.
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test, 1 3 it is not clear what the outcome in Beznos would be, or if
that outcome would reflect a proper result. The court would have to
grapple with the "wrongfulness" of the threat. In the instant case
the defendants threatened to destroy the part of the driveway that
they owned unless the plaintiffs compensated them. Since the land
154
was the defendants', they could do with it whatever they wanted.
Under a moral baseline approach, one could argue that because the
threatening party was not obligated to give up or even permit use of
the driveway, the threat to destroy it would not violate any legal or
moral duty; therefore, a duress claim should not succeed.155 The
proposal by the owner of the vacant lot, to sell the section of driveway
rather than destroy it, was an offer to make the plaintiff better off,
56
and not a coercive threat.
In duress analysis, however, whether a legal act is wrongful depends
upon the context. 57 Neither the wrongfulness nor the moral baseline
approaches determine whether an action is wrongful because threatening to exercise one's legal rights does not by itself resolve the
question of the propriety of the threat for Restatement purposes.
When the destruction of one's own property would secure no inherent
benefit, a threat to destroy it would be wrongful if made merely to
extort money from another party and if the "resulting exchange is
-See supra note 38.
There is no clear standard attached to a concept based on "doing what one wants with
one's own property." This can be seen by contrasting Beznos with Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57
N.J. Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1959). In Wolf, the plaintiffs sued to recover
a deposit on a house purchase that never closed. Id. at 280, 154 A.2d at 626. In defending its
refusal to return the deposit, the builder argued that it had been coerced into not consummating
the sale when the plaintiffs threatened to resell the house to an undesirable buyer should the
builder force the plaintiffs to go through with the sale. Id. at 282, 154 A.2d at 627-28. The
subsequent sale would reportedly ruin the builder's business. Id. Despite a finding that the
plaintiffs could lawfully sell the property to an "undesireable purchaser" should the deal close,
the court found the threat to be improper and coercive. Id. at 288, 154 A.2d at 630. Thus, if
the trial court found that the threats were made, and believed the builder's will was overcome,
the defendants could "treat the contract as breached, and recover damages." Id. at 288-89, 154
A.2d at 631. Beznos and Wolf demonstrate that there are limits to the legitimate use of one's
property.
It is difficult to resolve the question of the "wrongfulness" of the proposal in Beznos, because
a mere determination of lawfulness based on the idea that owners can do what they want with
their own property does not resolve the issue. This Article suggests one means-judicial
economy-for resolving the propriety of the threat when a reference to wrongfulness will not
suffice.
l5mSee supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
156Id.
157 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text; see also Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J.
Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (coercer's threat found wrongful for
purposes of duress action even though the act threatened was lawful).
'1
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Thus, in Beznos, even assuming that the threat

harmed the recipient and did not benefit the maker of the threat,
one would still need to resolve whether the exchange was fair. If
threats to exercise one's legal rights can provide the foundation for
a successful duress claim, the question becomes which legal threats
give rise to a claim. The Restatement tests are inadequate because
they state that sometimes an action is acceptable and sometimes it
is not. 159 Because they are so open-ended, the supplemental Restatement tests, which focus on unfair exchange, unfair dealing, and the
illegitimate use of power, are also inadequate guidelines on wrongfulness.

160

A final problem with the Restatement test is that to decide whether
the threat is wrongful or violative of a moral norm requires a circular
analysis. One cannot determine whether an action is wrongful or
violates a norm without an a priori understanding of whether the
behavior is acceptable. Thus, a rights-based approach derived from
either the Restatement or a moral baseline does not resolve the issue
of whether a threatened action is wrongful.
The policy of judicial economy could resolve these ambiguities.
Under the judicial economy analysis the appropriate question becomes:
Should duress be available in Beznos when the threat is the exercise
of a legal right? The court should find no duress because doing so
would only temporarily assist the plaintiff. Presumably, the defendant
would then bring an action for restitution for the value of the property
conveyed. A finding of duress will not solve the problem, but merely
add judicial costs. The parties will still have to expend additional
resources in order to reach a settlement on the driveway's value and
6
barring that, another court case will follow.' '

2. Continued Efficiency Concerns: Minimizing the Costs of
Resource Misallocation
A second efficiency rationale which should be adopted in duress
"5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2)(a) (1979); see also E.A. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 6, § 4.17, at 263.
"9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 & comments (1979).
1wSee id. § 176(2)(b)-(c); see also Dalton, supra note 3, at 1035 ("[O]ur doctrine has not
developed reliable guidelines for distinguishing this unacceptable conduct from the kind of selfinterested and self-reliant conduct on which the contractual system is based.").
161See infra Section III G (discussing economic negligence and exploring other policy reasons
which support a denial of the duress claim in Beznos). For more discussion of the economic
negligence concept, see infra text accompanying notes 376-85.
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cases focuses on the efficient prevention of resource misallocation.
This policy promotes the efficient allocation of resources by
putting the risk of voidability due to duress on the party who can
more easily discover that the deal was not voluntary.16 2 A deal isnot
voluntary if it is not likely to be value-maximizing for both par162Some critics might decry the return to voluntariness as an arbiter of duress. One could
argue that it does not make sense to designate voluntariness as a central component of duress
analysis because contracts entered into under extreme pressure are still voluntary in the sense
that the aggrieved party was still able to "choose rationally." See Bayles, Reconceptualizing
Necessity and Duress, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1191, 1209-10 (1987). This Article, however, focuses
on voluntariness in a different sense. It is not concerned with whether the victim actually
desired the transaction, the traditional focus of the will theory, see supra notes 20 and 61, but
with whether the coercer is likely to be aware that the deal is unlikely to be value-maximizing
for the victim. Professor Hillman discusses this concept when he suggests a presumption that
"a modification that involves a substantial net loss on the contract to the promisor is the
product of coercion." Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC: Good Faith and
the Doctrineof Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 886 (1979) [hereinafter Hillman, Contract
Modifications]. The "tip-off" that an agreement was coerced follows from the idea that "[r]easonable
persons ordinarily will not voluntarly [sic] relinquish important contract rights in return for
nothing or for very little." Id. at 885. The test, which is based on the efficient cost avoider
concept, is similar to a "reason to know" test. See Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial
Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 712-716 (1984) (discussing the use of the reason to know test
in promissory estoppel cases); Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and ContractMethod,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 793-96 (1982) (explaining the use of the reason to know test to
determine whether a contract was made).
There are three types of fact patterns which should raise a substantial doubt in the mind of
the putative coercer as to whether the deal is value-maximizing for the victim. In the first, the
difference between what the victim gives up and what the putative coercer gains in the exchange
is disproportionate. In the second type, the coercer withholds information from the victim and
it is not clear that the victim would have entered the deal had she been fully informed. Thus,
the deal is presumptively not value-maximizing. See infra notes 210-46 and accompanying text.
In the third type of case, there are persuasive barriers to bargaining that interfere with selfinterested hard bargaining. In all of these cases, the alleged coercer is, or should be, on notice
that the deal is too good to be true (disproportionately in her favor) and that the agreement
may not reflect the victim's best interest.
First Nat'l Bank v. Pepper, 547 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1976) is an example of a case involving
disproportionality in the exchange. When an attorney found a buyer for a corporation, but the
deal did not close, the attorney refused to turn over the corporate papers required for another
sale until stockholders paid him a $100,000 fee. Id. at 715. The attorney in this case demanded
payment even though he "had no reasonable basis for believing he was entitled to [the amount]"
he extracted from the stockholders. Id.; see also Furman v. Gulf Ins. Co., 152 F.2d 891 (8th
Cir. 1946) (when an insurance agent gave up an agency worth $20-25,000 in return for a release
from liability for $7,000 in debts, a valid claim of duress was stated); International Paper Co.
v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1985) (duress found when victim agreed to indemnify paper
company, which did not disclose the fact that there was $40,000 in potential liabilities, in
exchange for payment of an admitted debt of $7,000); Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978) (duress claim valid when debtor, knowing
creditor's financial difficulty, offered a $97,500 settlement on an acknowledged debt of $260,000300,000); Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1157, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 86, 88 (1984) (duress found when a subcontractor acquiesced in a $50,000 settlement of
an outstanding debt exceeding $72,000 "in order to survive"); Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc.,
231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404 (1950) (jury question on duress when an employee released claims
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ties.' 63 If one party could easily discover the involuntariness of the
transaction but enters into the deal anyway, the court should more
readily grant relief to the victim. 6 4 Therefore, the party who can
easily prevent a misallocation of resources will have an incentive to
do so. 1 65 On the other hand, if it would burden the coercer to ascertain
whether the deal is involuntary or if it would have other economic
or social costs that discourage acceptable behavior,' 66 courts should
be reluctant to find duress because it would increase the costs of
for services rendered that exceeded $6,800 for $200 under a threat of financial ruin and loss of
new job).
Cases involving the failure of one party to disclose information relevant to whether the deal
is value-maximizing for the other party are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 210-46.
The third category includes cases in which the agreement may not be value-maximizing for
one party and that fact is likely to be evident to the other party. These cases involve persuasive
barriers or reasons why one party does not bargain in its best interest. Such barriers are likely
to exist when the victim is enmeshed in a relationship with a third party such that she is
unable to act vigorously in her self interest. Cf Kostritsky, supra note 5, at 936-40 (discussing
relationships between the bargaining parties themselves). For cases recognizing the impact of
a relationship with a third party, see Haumont v. Security State Bank, 220 Neb. 809, 374
N.W.2d 2 (1985) (parents permitted to avoid a mortgage and guarantee agreement that they
executed under a threat of prosecution of their son); Port of Nehalem v. Nicholson, 122 Or.
523, 259 P. 900 (1927) (defendant's agreement to pay $4,407.34 to prevent the criminal prosecution
of a family member was voidable on the basis of duress), overruled on other grounds, Godell
v. Johnson, 244 Or. 587, 418 P.2d 505 (1966).
It is possible to posit separate rationales for each of these lines of cases. For example, a
finding that the cases which involve a disproportionality in exchange are more likely to
successfully invoke duress can be explained in terms of a regulatory concern with policing unfair
bargains, see, e.g., Dawson, supra note 3, at 282-88 (discussing duress in terms of preventing
unjust enrichment), or in terms of the intrusion of distributive or altruistic motives. The
distributive justice explanation cannot and should not be summarily rejected. Many modern
commentators subscribe to the notion of duress as a doctrine for correcting unfair exchanges.
See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 3, at 1031-39 (discussing modern contract law and its focus on
fairness). Nevertheless, the distributive justice or fairness explanation for duress claims is not
entirely satisfactory. If one were to carry distributive and fairness concerns to their logical
conclusion, then more plaintiffs would prevail than currently do. Moreover, if fairness is the
operative norm, it is not clear why duress doctrine has not been extended to correct imbalances
in available resources that limit some parties' choices. See supra note 9.
One advantage of an explanation based on the efficient resource allocation theory is that it
provides an overarching theory capable of explaining different lines of cases. Thus, it would
meet one of Professor Barnett's criteria for a superior theory-this is, that "the number of
known problems the theory handles as well or better than its rivals .... " Barnett, supra note
1, at 270. Moreover, denying enforcement of such bargains would have the significant benefit
of avoiding a costly waste of resources. Finally, it would provide a mechanism for courts to
avoid reading erroneous results that might. obtain if they followed current theories. See infra
text accompanying notes 200-09.
,'3One of the primary benefits to voluntary exchange is that it maximizes value on both an
individual and societal basis. A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 120, at 1-2.
'64Allocating the cost of a misallocation to the party who can most easily prevent the problem
is a proper basis for formulating legal rules. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and
the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-9 (1978) (discussing allocation of risk).
'MId. at 7.
'

See infra text accompanying notes 266-80.
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contracting. In addition, the policy of efficient prevention of resource
misallocation would promote standardization of applications of duress
167
and supplement difficult doctrinal analysis.
Courts should consider several factors in deciding if either party
is in a better position to prevent a misallocation of resources. These
factors include whether persuasive barriers that interfere with a party's
hard bargaining exist 168 and whether there is an apparent disproportionality in the exchange. If such barriers are palpable and one party
can easily detect them while the other party cannot, and the barriers
are accompanied by a disproportionate exchange, the court should
more readily allocate the risk of duress to the party who can easily
prevent resource misallocation. This would reduce contracting costs
by reducing the resources that must be devoted to discovering errors
in resource allocation. This approach is consistent with that taken
in other contexts such as mistake 69 and fraud. 70
Another factor that courts should consider is the merits of the
victim's claim. If the victim has a losing case, the other party will
assume that any deal offered is enforceable and valid. The coercer
is likely to assume that whatever she offers the other party is within
acceptable norms and that she will not be accused of coercion in
connection with extra concessions to the "victim." It would be difficult
and costly to deter behavior that is considered "normal." If such
behavior is subject to a charge of coercion, it may lead coercers to
overcompensate to avoid all potential deals that the other party may
later exploit for duress purposes. This would not be efficient or
conducive to economic investment.
It would also be costly to deter the coercer when the victim has
no legal rights and the coercer is the one who makes the concession
because there is nothing to arouse the coercer's suspicions about the
transaction. When the coercer makes the concessions, receiving nothing that she is not already entitled to,' 7' she is likely to assume that
the transaction, if voidable by anyone, would be voidable by her on
the ground of lack of consideration. 1 72 In this instance, the party who
167
168

See infra text accompanying notes 210-46.
For a discussion of the types of barriers that can interfere with self-interested hard

bargaining, see Kostritsky, supra note 5, at 935-40.
'11
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153, 154 (1979).
70
' See id. § 164.
17' The parameters to the entitlement may be set by the terms of the contract.
172 That assumption is likely to arise because in other contexts, a disproportionality in exchange
may entitle the adversely affected party to avoid its contract obligation. See, e.g., Jones v. Star
Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (when the contract price was
unconscionable, the court reformed the installment contract to reflect the amount paid).
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is in the best position to detect a misallocation of resources would
not be the coercer. The only party with reason to suspect a misallocation would be the victim; therefore, the court should not find
duress as it would place the burden of detection on the wrong party.
a. Applying the Efficient Preventionof Resource MisallocationConcept
Day v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc.173 illustrates the difficulty of detecting
the involuntariness of an agreement. In Bicknell Minerals, Union
Minere began negotiating to buy Bicknell Minerals from its shareholders. 74 After some negotiations, the parties concluded a tentative
oral agreement under which the buyer would pay a stipulated amount
for the stock and would also release the shareholders from certain
liabilities.175 When Union Minere's board of directors would not ratify
the tentative purchase agreement, the parties executed a written
agreement containing terms less favorable to the stockholders. 176 When
the buyer sued for specific performance of the written agreement, the
shareholders counterclaimed requesting that the written agreement
be reformed to the original oral terms, arguing that they had acquiesced to the less favorable written agreement under duress.' 77 The
court rejected the duress claim because "there is no evidence of any
wrongful act or coercion of the shareholders" by the buyer.178 Additionally, the court found that the seller's absence of choice was not
caused by the buyer. 79 The seller was in financial straits due to its
own actions in a prior default.18° Moreover, the court found no lack
18
of free will. '
Bicknell Minerals can be analyzed under the normative standards
of the Restatement's wrongful act doctrinal element.182 It is not clear,
however, that the conclusion of no wrongful act is compelled. The
stockholders' claim is that the buyer took advantage of the seller's
economic straits, causing it to succumb to unfavorable contract terms.
'Was this pressure merely hard bargaining or was it wrongful coer7

480 N.E.2d 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).

171Id.
75

'
176

at 568.

Id. at 569.

Id.

177Id.

at 569-70.
"I Id. at 571.
19 Id.
180Id.

"IId.

at 571-72.

182
Id. (focusing on the wrongful act question).
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cion?"1 3 One application of the wrongful act doctrine suggests the
following analysis. Because the buyer was not obligated to close the
deal, he could insist on any terms he chose to close the deal.184 From
this perspective, the Bicknell Minerals case is no different from any
case in which one party negotiating a deal says to the other party:
"Here are my terms-take them or leave them." Under that conceptual
framework, the threat not to close except on the given terms is not
wrongful. To hold otherwise would subject all contracts to claims of
voidability on duress grounds because most contract negotiations
include a threat at some point not to close except on certain terms.'8
Because there is no obligation to close, threats in such circumstances
are not wrongful.se
Bicknell Minerals can also be viewed as a situation in which one
party with no contract obligation to the other, exploits the other's
economic straits. If so, it is not so easy to conclude that the conduct
of the purchaser was benign. Even when a coercer has no obligation
to make an offer to the other party, the resulting agreement may be
voidable for duress, if she exploits the dire economic straits of the
other party to extract a favorable deal.18 7 The issue becomes what
factor establishes an actionable claim.' s The wrongfulness analysis
fails to provide an answer.
In Bicknell Minerals, the court also justified its holding of no duress
on the finding that the buyer did not cause the stockholders' "precarious" economic situation. 89 This explanation offers no help analytically because courts sometimes find a wrongful act even when the
"'
See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 4.17, at 263-64 (distinguishing legitimate from
improper use of power).
I A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 41-44, 214 (discussing the relationship between a lack
of obligation and an absence of duress).
-85Cf. Dalzell, Duress I, supra note 4, at 239 ("Plainly most contracts that are enforced are
entered into merely as a means of avoiding a less desirable alternative, hence this fact cannot
be said to impair that real consent which is essential.").
"1 This can be seen in Bicknell Minerals. See supra notes 173-98 and accompanying text.
The case involves an implied threat amounting to "deal with us on these terms or there is no
deal."
187In every situation in which the putative coercer makes the offer "take my terms or none,"
the coercer could argue that she is protected because the victim can always walk away from
the deal. But in some instances a court views that option as unpalatable and finds duress.
Thus, the option of walking away from the deal cannot itself explain the BickneU Minerals
result.
"8 It could be argued that actionable claims involve unfairly taking advantage of another's
economic necessities, but it is not clear what factors would prevent that same analysis from
voiding unfavorable contracts to which parties agree because they have few alternatives.
" Day v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 567, 571-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
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coercer's contribution to the victim's economic straits is problematic. 190
Thus, the fact that the buyer did not cause the stockholders' dire
financial straits does not preclude a claim of duress. The labeling of
the action as not wrongful thus seems mechancially easy to reach
without being compelled or inevitably correct.
To resolve any doctrinal ambiguities in the Bicknell Minerals case
the court should analyze the case under the resource misallocation
rubric. In Bicknell Minerals, the buyer (putative coercer) would probably not suspect resource misallocation for several reasons. The parties
were deemed to be "sophisticated businesses and businessmen dealing
with each other on behalf of their principals.' 191 In this respect, there
were no obvious impediments to the parties being able to act ruthlessly
in pursuing their self-interest. 19 Furthermore, the parties were not
locked into an ongoing relationship. 93 Had they been, there might
have been persuasive barriers to self-interested negotiation. Moreover,
because the shareholders had pursued the possibility of a sale to
another entity, they appeared to be capable of acting in their selfinterest. 94 Finally, as part of the deal the buyer agreed to assume
certain bank debts, to release the individual shareholders from personal liabilities, and to give the shareholders two million dollars from
future income. 95 There appears to be no gross disparity in the exchange;196 both the buyer and the shareholders were taking certain
risks and obtaining certain benefits. The buyer gained shares that
could become more or less valuable in exchange for incurring substantial liability. The shareholders were relieved of certain liabilities
but risked the possibility that the shares could become more valuable
in the hands of the buyer.197
I When a debtor threatens to withhold an admitted debt or to pay less than the amount
owed, the court must decide whether the proposal to pay less was mere exploitation of the
creditor's economic straits or whether the proposer contributed to the financial difficulties. In
Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978) the
court cited the rule that economic necessities alone are insufficient for a duress claim unless
they are caused by the coercer, and then found sufficient evidence of duress to require a trial.
In order to win, the creditor would have to establish causation between its economic straits
and the threat to delay payment if the creditor did not settle for a lesser amount. Id. at 1819. It is not clear that it will be able to establish this unless it is determined that all threats
to pay a reduced amount to a creditor automatically "cause" desperate financial straits.
Bicknell Minerals, 480 N.E.2d at 571.
192See Kostritsky, supra note 5, at 935-40 (discussing barriers to self-interested hard bargaining).
13 See Bicknell Minerals, 480 N.E.2d at 568-69.
4

19 Id.

at 571.

191
Id. at 569.
11 See supra note 162 (discussing disproportionality of exchange as a factor).
197Each

party to a contract takes certain risks in the hope that future gains will result from

taking the risk.
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Because no "red flags" existed to indicate problems in bargaining
power or unconscionable dealing, the buyer in Bicknell Minerals should
have been able to assume that the deal was voluntary. As this
transaction entailed risks and benefits for both sides,19 there would
have been an enormous cost in alerting the buyers to the shareholders'
secret doubts about the transaction. On the other hand, the shareholders were in a position to know that the buyer would never have
assumed the debts and liabilities without the tendered stock. Thus,
the shareholders were in the best position to prevent a misallocation
of resources. To find duress against the buyer would put an undue
burden on the buyer to discover involuntariness. 199 If the court permitted an economic duress claim, transaction costs of negotiating the
sale would have been wasted. To avoid that result, future buyers will
have to expend resources toward discovering whether the seller has
any duress grounds for attacking the deal. To permit a claim of
duress in such a situation would promote an inefficient use of resources. Thus, it makes economic sense to deny the duress claim.
The case of Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co.200 provides an

example of how the resource misallocation theory permits an outcome
different from that reached by the court under traditional doctrinal
duress analysis. In that case, the court ignored the resource misallocation policy and reached an erroneous result. The plaintiff/subcontractor had agreed to complete a job for a fixed fee and rather
than terminate the job when the defendant/general contractor delayed
in supplying materials, the plaintiff agreed to complete the job for a
20 1
negotiated extra amount.

Upon completion, the subcontractor submitted a claim for $120,000,
but the general contractor refused to pay more than $67,000.202 The
subcontrator was "in desperate financial straits" and therefore acINFor examples in which the court found no actionable duress since there appeared to be
risk and benefit on both sides, see Higgins v. Brunswick Corp., 76 Ill. App. 3d 273, 395 N.E.2d
81 (1979) (creditor-lessor dismissed its lawsuit and paid off unsecured creditors of debtor-lessor
in exchange for a lease of a bowling alley); King Enters. v. Manchester Water Works, 122 N.H.
1011, 453 A.2d 1276 (1982) (city (purported coercer) constructed water connections needed for
builder's apartment complex in exchange for builder's agreement to pay for the connections);
Grad v. Roberts, 14 N.Y.2d 70, 198 N.E.2d 26, 248 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1964) (stock was released
in exchange for payment of a legitimate debt); Crocker v. Schneider, 683 S.W.2d 335 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1984) (settlement for services rendered was exchanged for a waiver, which allowed a
closing to go forward).
'" Otherwise, alleged coercers will devote an enormous expenditure of resources to ascertaining
the voluntariness of a transaction, which will contribute to a misallocation of resources.
-o704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983).
201Id. at 926.
2w

Id.
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quiesced in the lower payment.20 3 The subcontractor filed suit against
the general contractor claiming that the reduced settlement had been
procured by duress.204
The Selmer court rejected the duress claim because the putative
coercer had not actually caused the purported victim's economic
distress. 20 5 The court noted the importance of enforcing contractual
settlements in order to uphold the reliability of out-of-court resolutions
of contract disputes to protect parties who could not afford to liti2 06
gate.
There are several difficulties in the court's justifications for the
conclusion that no duress existed. The policy favoring settlements
does not resolve the basic problem of contract law that arises from
the difficulty of distinguishing between enforceable and unenforceable
settlements.20 7 Likewise, the court's second justification, that the defendant did not cause the claimant's economic difficulties, has proven
not to be determinative.208
Under the misallocation of resources test, the duress claim should
have been allowed in Selmer. The general contractor was the party
in the best position to prevent a misallocation of resources. Clearly,
the subcontractor would not have continued to expend resources had
the general contractor not agreed to pay the additional amount.
Because the general contractor specifically sought the expenditures,
the subcontractor had no reason to suspect that the general contractor
would refuse to pay extra for the work caused by the delay.
The resource misallocation theory might have advantages over a
fairness theory based on disproportionality in exchange.209 The settlement for the extra expenses might not be so grossly disproportionate
as to be unfair. Nevertheless, because the general contractor had
every reason to believe that the subcontractor would not have allocated
his resources for the job if the general contractor had not agreed to
pay the extra expenses incurred, the resource misallocation theory
suggests that the agreement should be voidable. Otherwise a party
who might easily prevent resource misallocation will fail to do so,
promoting costly misallocation.
203

Id.

204Id.

"I Id. at 928-29.

Id. at 928.
101If the policy favoring settlements were in fact determinative, then no settlements would
be voidable for duress.
208 See supra note 190.
209 See supra note 162.
2
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b. Explaining the Success of Duress Cases Involving Fraud Based on
Efficient Prevention of Resource Misallocation
The line of cases involving the intersection of fraud and coercive
proposals implicitly reflects the importance of the resource misallocation analysis in deciding duress issues. 210 Under the resource misallocation analysis the party that commits fraud by withholding
relevant and material information could easily have disclosed the
information and prevented a resource misallocation by the less informed party. 211 Therefore, the party committing fraud should be
subject to the risk of voidability on the ground of duress.
Application of the efficient prevention of resource misallocation
theory to cases involving both fraud and duress issues 212 will effectively
show why plaintiffs are likely to prevail on duress. The recognition
of a resource misallocation analysis achieves the societal benefit of
preventing resource misallocation at a low cost, thereby promoting
economic efficiency. The resource misallocation theory also provides
a normative standard for deciding cases and thus promotes predictability in judicial decisionmaking. In contrast, when approached from
210

For a case recognizing the interconnection between fraud and duress, see Leeper v. Beltrami,

53 Cal. 2d 195, 207, 347 P.2d 12, 21, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12, 21 (1959) ("The two types of wrongdoing,
duress and fraud, are often factually closely interconnected and indistinguishable."). This Article
explains both doctrines in terms of one theory based on the efficient prevention of resource
misallocation.
211 The party committing the fraud withholds or distorts information when the disclosure of
that information could have prevented resource misallocation. This assumes, of course, that a
fully informed party will not misallocate their resources.
212See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1985) (blanket indemnity
was voidable for duress where defendant indemnitee withheld information bearing on potential
liability of indemnitor); Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154,
204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1984) (after defendant misled plaintiff into thinking that extra expenses
incurred in performing a grading contract would be covered, defendant then demanded that
plaintiff accept less than the amount promised and was subject to a duress claim); Scutti v.
State Rd. Dep't, 220 So. 2d 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (where county misled property owners
and refused to issue a necessary permit because of nonexisting setback violations, the resulting
agreement, which limited damages for this property taking was voidable for duress); Manufacturers Am. Bank v. Stamatis, 719 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (bank customer was permitted
to allege duress in signing a note where bank erroneously indicated a failure to sign would
subject the maker to criminal and civil penalties); Peter Matthews Ltd. v. Robert Mabey, Inc.,
117 A.D.2d 943, 499 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1986) (moving company presented a bill of lading limiting
damages to $15,000, but there was no evidence that a liability limit had been disclosed when
plaintiff selected the moving company); Harstad v. Frol, 41 Wash. App. 294, 704 P.2d 638
(1985) (broker-agent failed to disclose a personal interest in the transaction and further misled
seller into believing that seller must assume a large debt to close the real estate deal); Litten
v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 220 Pa. Super. 274, 286 A.2d 913 (1971) (buyer who misled seller into
believing that an oral agreement would govern a subsequent dealing threatened a breach unless
seller entered a written agreement with substantially different terms).
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a purely doctrinal standpoint under the Restatement test for duress,
the finding of duress remains inexplicable. Courts are likely to find
contracts voidable for duress even though the doctrinal requirements
of duress are not met.
International Paper Co. v. Whilden 21 . illustrates this type of fraud
and duress situation. In this case, a paper company, International,
agreed to buy timber from the owners of a tract of land.2 14 A third
party, Whilden, who had contracted to cut and haul the timber,
entered into a subsequent contract to buy logs from International
and made a down payment as required by the contract. 2 - After the
cutting project was finished, International owed Whilden $7,000,216
which represented the difference between the advance payment and
the actual cost of the logs. 2' 7 International refused to refund the excess
money unless Whilden agreed to indemnify International for liability
to the land owner for damages allegedly arising out of the cutting
project.218 Whilden agreed to the indemnity provision, but later claimed
that he was unaware the land owner was claiming $40,000 in damages
against International for its unauthorized cutting of trees.2 1 9 Apparently, Whilden was under the impression that thirty unauthorized
trees had been cut down.220 In fact, the total was 650.221
At trial, Whilden was successful in arguing that the indemnity
agreement had been executed under duress.222 The appellate court
upheld this finding based on the unequal bargaining power between
2 24
the parties,2 23 and the plaintiff's financial hardship.
Under traditional contract law, the "threat" to withhold an admitted
debt 225 is not enough on its own to support a finding of duress.226
The additional factors cited by the court-unequal bargaining power
and economic hardship to plaintiff-are also insufficient to mandate
469 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1985).
Id. at 561.

213

214
2 15

216

Id.
Id. at 562.

2,7

Id. at 561.

21 8

Id. at 562.

Id.

219
220

Id.

221Id.

at 563.

Id.
223 Id.
222

225

Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 563.

226

E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 4.18, at 266 ("[Clourts have traditionally assumed that

224

a reasonable alternative was available in the case of a threat not to pay money . .

").
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a finding of duress. 22 7 Furthermore, the plaintiff must ordinarily show
that the defendant caused the plaintiffs economic hardship. 228 Although the court found that Whilden had no reasonable alternative
but to agree to indemnify, other courts have refused to provide relief
for a party who has agreed to particular terms because of the seemingly
22 9
greater economic leverage and bargaining power of the other party.
The court's willingness in International Paper to find duress despite
the factors that weigh against such a holding may be partially attributable to International's nondisclosure of the extent of the liability
for improperly cut timber. Nevertheless, an examination of the underlying policy concerns of the efficient prevention of resource misallocation doctrine may explain why the court relaxed the requirements for duress in this case.
Under the efficient prevention of resource misallocation doctrine,
International should assume the risk of voidability because it withheld
information concerning the improperly cut timber, 230 knowing that it
was depriving Whilden of material information that might have affected Whilden's willingness to sign the indemnity agreement. International was clearly in the best position to prevent a misallocation
of Whilden's resources. Whilden had no reason to suspect that the
deal with International was not in International's best interest. If
duress had been denied, future parties relying on this doctrine would
Unequal bargaining power alone is not a sufficient basis for invalidating contracts on duress
grounds. If unequal bargaining power were operative as an independent determinative factor,
then most cases of duress would be decided in favor of the claimants. As one commentator
stated:
If the mere fact of impaired bargaining power, in combination with an inequivalence of
exchange, were enough to invoke duress doctrine, impaired bargaining power would not serve
the purpose Dawson acknowledges it still must: isolating just those kinds of impairment
that the law is prepared to redress without feeling that the whole structure of bargaining
between unequals is put in jeopardy.
Dalton, supra note 3 at 1031.
228 Courts generally require a showing that the plaintiff's dire financial circumstances have
been caused by the defendent. If the defendant merely takes advantage of already existing
circumstances, the plaintiff is not usually successful in claiming duress. See, e.g., W.R. Grimshaw
Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896, 904 (8th Cir. 1957) ("The assertion of duress must
be proven by evidence that the duress resulted from defendant's wrongful and oppressive conduct
and not by plaintiff's necessities."), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 912 (1958); Fruhauf Sw. Garment
Co. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 945, 951 (Ct. Cl. 1953) ("It has become settled law that
the mere stress of business conditions will not constitute duress where the defendant was not
responsible for those circumstances."); First Tex. Say. Ass'n v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d
179, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) ("Stress of business conditions will not constitute duress unless
the defendant was responsible for that condition.").
229 See, e.g., Schmalz v. Hardy Salt Co., 739 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (despite inequality
in bargaining power generally found between employer and employee, employee loses on the
duress claim).
m International Paper Co. v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560, 563 (Ala. 1985).
227
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incur excessive search costs to determine whether the proposed transaction was value-maximizing, thus increasing contracting costs.
Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Development, Inc.231 is an illustration

of a situation in which the "victim" of coercion incurs an expense
at the behest of the "coercer." The coercer then offers the victim a
settlement that differs materially from that which was promised to
secure the expenditures. The victim acquiesces and then sues for
duress. 232 In this case, the defendant/general contractor hired the

plaintiff/subcontractor to do excavation work for a fixed amount.233
The contract expressly stated that "[a]ny rock encountered will be
considered an extra at current rental rates.

'234

When rock was en-

countered, the parties negotiated a price for the blasting work but
"emphasized, however, [that] the estimate was not firm and the actual
cost could go much higher due to the unpredictable nature of rock
work.

' 235

During the excavation, the general contractor did not ques-

tion the interim billings and assured the subcontractor that the extra
costs would be paid. 236 When the subcontractor posted the final billing,

the general contractor refused to pay the billed amount and offered
a substantially lower settlement. 237 The subcontractor agreed to the

settlement because it was "'under duress in that [they] felt they
would face financial ruin if they did not accept the lesser sum and
that defendants, knowing this, threatened no further payment
unless"' the lower sum was accepted. 238 The Rich & Whillock court

found that the defendant's settlement offer was made in bad faith
and was coercive given the circumstances of the plaintiffs precarious
financial position and the possibility of impending bankruptcy.2 39 The
plaintiff was therefore permitted to rescind the settlement agreement
and the court awarded the full amount due under the original agreement.

240

The Rich & Whillock result granting duress relief does make eco157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1984).
e.g., Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983) (general
contractor made subcontractor a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer of $67,000 on a $120,000
claim).
233Rich & Whillock, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1156, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
234 Id.
231

232See,

2 3 3

5

d.

mId., 204 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
-7Id.
at 1156-57, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
-Id. at 1157, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 88. The general contractor offered to pay the subcontractor
$50,000 on the remaining balance of $72,286.45 if the subcontractor accepted the lower payment
and signed a standard release. Id. at 1156-57, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
239
240

Id. at 1160, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91.
Id. at 1161, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 91.

19891

Duress Policy Guide

nomic sense when analyzed under a burden allocation analysis. Yet
an examination of other cases suggests that a denial of relief might
also have been appropriate because courts have often refused relief
on grounds of duress when a party has agreed to settlement because
of serious financial problems. 241 Moreover, where the facts are reversed

and the party seeking relief for duress has been subjected to a price
increase, rather than a reduced settlement offer, courts have refused
to grant that relief despite financial problems. 242 Courts rationalize

their refusals of relief by distinguishing "causing" from merely "taking
advantage" of an unequal situation. 243 Courts posit that unless the

putative coercer was directly responsible for, or "caused" the "victim's" necessitous economic circumstances, 244 no relief is available.
In Rich & Whillock, although the defendant's low offer certainly made
an already precarious economic situation worse, it is hard to conclude
that the defendant caused the impending bankruptcy. If Rich & Willock
is indicative of the manner in which the "causing" doctrine will
typically be analyzed, it may prove so manipulable that no party can
rely on the result of its application.
Because the result in Rich & Whillock is problematic in light of
existing doctrinal distinctions, the efficient prevention of resource
misallocation doctrine should be applied to help explain the holding
of the case. Under the theory of efficient prevention of resource
misallocation doctrine, the general contractor was in the best position
to prevent a misallocation of resources. The risk of voidability on
duress grounds should have been allocated to him, and the subcontractor left with the option to rescind the reduced settlement. At the
time the subcontractor allocated its resources to excavation the general
contractor had every reason to know that the subcontractor would
not allocate resources to the rock excavation without an agreement
to be paid in full for the extra work. 245 In order to encourage disclosure
of material information affecting resource allocation and thus the
See, e.g., Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 576, 8 N.W. 511, 514 (1881) (refusal by debtor
to pay the full debt that was due did not constitute duress despite the fact that "plaintiff was
in great need of the money and might be financially ruined in case he failed to obtain it").
242See, e.g., London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1965)
(finding no duress when defendant refused to perform a contract unless plaintiff paid more for
the land even though plaintiffs failure to agree would subject him to economic hardship).
2143
See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 39-41 (discussing "causing" and "taking advantage"
as distinguished in case law).
2" Id. at 39.
24 Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1156, 204 Cal. Rptr.
86, 88 (1984).
241
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efficient use of resources, claims of duress by parties in the position
of the subcontractor ought to be granted.46
c. Under the Efficient Prevention of Resource Misallocation Doctrine
Agreements are Voidable When There is No Reasonable Basis for the
Threat of Civil Process
Efficient prevention of resource misallocation offers an explanatory
rationale for another application of the duress doctrine. Traditionally,
a party may void an agreement when civil process is threatened but
there is no reasonable basis for believing that the claim has merit.24 7
Although commentators have rationalized this result in terms of abuse
of process, efficient prevention of resource misallocation provides a
persuasive alternative rationale. The coercer, who knows that the
threatened suit lacks a reasonable basis, is in the best position to
prevent the misallocation of resources through disclosure of that fact.
Nevertheless, in taking advantage of her superior knowledge over the
other party, she has affirmatively assisted in the misallocation of
resources to benefit her own interests. The doctrine of duress should
be administered to force the necessary disclosure and thereby efficiently allocate resources.
d. Response to Critiques of the Efficient Prevention of Resource
Misallocation Theory
The efficient prevention of resource misallocation theory is open
to criticism on the ground that the test, which is partially based on
concepts of bargaining and on terms of exchange, is not necessarily
more persuasive than the traditional test based on concepts of fairness
reflected in the Restatement.248 The resource misallocation test serves
as an attractive alternative, however, which has several advantages
over the fairness test. First, the fairness concept is so manipulable
that the result of its application as reflected in case law is inconsistent
246 See R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 85 (discussing the importance of assigning the risk by
asking "[w]ill imposing liability create incentives for value-maximizing conduct in the future?").
247 E.A. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 6, § 4.17, at 260-61; see also Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal.
2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959) (finding wrongful conduct amounted to duress when
defendants knowingly asserted a false claim on property).
248 The test based on fairness has been proposed by Professor Dawson, see Dawson,
supra
note 3, and endorsed by others, including Professor Dalton. See Dalton, supra note 5; supra
text accompanying note 113.
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and unpersuasive. The efficient prevention of resource misallocation
theory offers courts additional factors on which to focus and provides
guidance that may enhance predictability. Second, the resource misallocation theory is advantageous for its ability to explain other factors
such as the correlation between fraud and duress. Finally, as is
indicated by the Selmer case discussed above, the resource misallocation theory has a particular advantage when compared with the
fairness theory based on disproportionality in exchange.
e.

Postscript

The foregoing discussion suggests that the law should allocate the
risk of voidability on duress grounds to the party who can most easily
prevent a misallocation of resources and fails to do so. Nevertheless,
courts may be able to prevent resource misallocation by refusing to
entertain duress claims when the alleged victim has a losing contract
claim.2 4 9 If parties with losing contract claims are given an avoidance
mechanism, they may begin to think that the courts will save them
from losing deals. Parties will then allocate their resources recklessly
by undervaluing the risks associated with the business transaction.
The parties will neglect to take account of the fact that the other
party may offer them a modified agreement incapable of being attacked
on duress grounds, but will decide to walk away from the deal
altogether. If a party has a losing claim on the merits and is permitted
to prevail on a duress claim, parties will begin to discount the risk
associated with the losing claim and invest more resources in that
enterprise. Thus, the risk will tend to become undervalued.
3.

Efficient Economic Results: A Normative Analysis

A third type of efficiency concern, efficiency of outcome, often
influences the manner in which duress cases are decided. This concept
dictates that a court should not allow the duress defense when a
waste of economic resources or costly overdeterrence would result. A
theory of efficient normative outcomes may prove useful for identifying
cases in which duress claims should be permitted. Because of the
manipulability of their doctrinal elements, 25 0 current theories do not
249

See supra note 146.

1 See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
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provide a complete or satisfactory analysis of these cases.
The prevention of costly overdeterrence by a non-superior risk
bearer is one normative efficiency concern. 251 The superior risk bearer
is that party to whom a risk should be allocated because she can
most efficiently reduce the cost of the risk to both parties. 252 Courts
should allocate risk in a manner that coincides with private risk
allocation 253 and, thus, does not prompt costly measures and wasted
resources.
Red-Samm Mining Co. v. Port of Seattle254 is an example of a case
in which the party claiming duress is the superior risk bearer. A
finding of duress for the claimant here would require the non-superior
risk bearer to take steps that would be costly, resulting in a waste
of resources. The plaintiff contractor in Red-Samm bid on a construction contract for the defendant. 255 After the bids were opened,
the defendant, Port of Seattle, discovered an arithmetical error in
the calculation of the bid. 256 The defendant then offered the plaintiff
the bid at the lower corrected amount. 2 7 The plaintiff agreed, but
later argued that it had agreed to the lower amount under compulsion. 25 8 The court rejected the duress claim on the basis of the
availability of reasonable alternatives, including refusing to accept
the job at that amount. 259 The presence of an alternative indicates
that the second prong of doctrinal duress 260 was not met and, thus,
the duress claim was defeated.
The doctrinal analysis, however, is not wholly satisfactory. The
conclusion that no reasonable alternative existed appears to be a label
that the court attaches to, rather than a persuasive rationale for, the
25,Professor Halpern addresses this concept of risk allocation when he states:

The efficiency analysis, whether in terms of "superior risk bearer" or "least-cost bearer," or
more general efficiency criteria, is a determination as to how two supposedly risk averse
parties would have allocated the risk of disruptive events had they been required specifically
to do so and had their goal been an efficient, least-cost, present transaction. What is involved
is a complicated set of trade-offs relating to how much each party would have been willing
to pay to have the other assume the risk.
Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability:Searching for "The Wisdom
of Solomon," 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1160 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
22
Id. at 1157-59.
For a discussion of the would-be private allocation, see Kennedy, Distributiveand Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 597-603 (1982).
254 8 Wash. App. 610, 508 P.2d 175 (1973).
255Id.
at 612-13, 508 P.2d at 176-77.
2" Id. at 613, 508 P.2d at 177.
25 7

Id.

2 Id.

-" Id. at 614-16, 508 P.2d at 178-79.
See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.

2
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denial of recovery. The court does not offer a persuasive rationale
for why the possible alternative of rejecting the bid, and thereby
losing the job and its contract bid bond, was reasonable. 261 In every
case, the party claiming duress asserts that economic necessities
dictate acquiescence in the deal, and in each case, the court must
determine if the available options were "reasonable alternatives" to
the proffered deal. Unfortunately, this test gives the court discretion
and offers no guidance to the contracting parties.
An approach based on either a moral baseline262 or on the wrongful
act prong of doctrinal duress 263 suggests the following analysis of the
no-recovery result in Red-Samm: Because the Port of Seattle was
under no legal or moral obligation to accept the contractor's bid, a
proposal to the contractor on any terms that would close the transaction would make the contractor better off and would therefore not
be wrongful. Measured against a baseline of no deal at all, the proposal
is a noncoercive offer.
A legal rights analysis based on either the wrongful act component
or the moral baseline analysis seems deficient both as an explanatory
rationale and as a normative standard. Because courts sometimes find
duress when the option offered the victim is extremely grim or made
in bad faith, even if the purported coercer acts wholly within her
lawful rights, 264 those approaches fail to explain why the threat to
exercise a legal right in a particular case is different and therefore
not subject to attack on duress grounds.
Because of the shortcomings of current theories, a policy approach
should be adopted. A persuasive policy reason suggests that the duress
claim should indeed be rejected in Red-Samm; granting duress might
promote overdeterrence and inefficiency by prompting the Port of
Seattle to oversee and double-check all bids made by contractors
before their submission to insure their accuracy and catch subcontractors' arithmetical errors. Yet, the party in the best position to
prevent an arithmetical error at the least cost is the party who
submits the bid. If a court denied the Port of Seattle the right to
261 See

Red-Samm, 8 Wash. App. at 615-16, 508 P.2d at 178-79.

2 See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
263See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
2111Arguably what distinguishes those cases in which courts find actionable duress, despite the
fact that one party was exercising legal rights, is the presence of other factors such as unequal
bargaining power, unjust enrichment, or bad faith. Since none of these factors are present in
Red-Samm, there is nothing to make the threat to "deal with me on my terms or not at all"
a wrongful one.
This Article suggests that the legal rights analysis is flawed and therefore it might be helpful
to look to external policy considerations to determine whether a duress claim should be permitted.
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require performance at the lower corrected dollar figure, the Port, in
an effort to foreclose the possibility of an agreement being voided,
might be tempted to hire extra employees to insure that the bidders
do the correct arithmetic before they submit their bids. This would
result in a costly waste of resources. If the Port of Seattle made a
similar offer to the next lowest bidder (who also made a mistake in
calculation), the Port would risk the repeat result of the bidder voiding
the agreement. To avoid that result, the Port might insist on reviewing
the arithmetic of the bids before they were submitted, thus insuring
against the possibility of a repeated voiding of agreements on duress
grounds. Yet, the party in the best position to prevent the mistake
from occurring is the bidder himself.265 To avoid that costly oversight,
the court should deny the duress claim. In that way, the recipient
of the bid will not be induced to undertake expensive and costly
double-checking of the figures.
Costly overdeterrence can provide a benchmark for separating valid
from invalid duress claims in a variety of other contexts as well.
Overdeterrence may result if parties prevail on duress claims when
the "coercing party" has acted within the ambit of generally accepted
behavior and norms. 266 To hold otherwise would generate unnecessary
costs. If courts were to void for duress such commonly accepted
behavior as a private physician conditioning tr.eatment of a patient
on the payment of a fair price,2 67 courts would have a hard time
convincing doctors that they were exerting unacceptable pressure in
charging a fair price.
The costly overdeterrence that may occur if a court voids a contract
2 Kronman discusses this same concept in connection with unilateral mistake. Kronman,
supra note 164, at 6-9.
266Acceptable behavioral norms might not be considered a novel test, but merely a different
label for lawful behavior. Behavioral norms, however, include legal norms as well as social norms.
A concern with social norms is not novel; some commentators would set the relevant baselines
by such norms. See, e.g., A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 207 (measuring one baseline by
"what is 'normal' in . . . society"). The focus here is different-it is on the costly waste of
resources that would result if one were to set baselines at odds with social norms.
This framework may be helpful in rethinking Eisele v. Ayers, 63 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 381 N.E.2d
21 (1978). In Eisele, medical students challenged a large tuition increase, partly on duress
grounds. Id. at 1041-42, 381 N.E.2d at 24. The court rejected the duress claim, stating that,
"in light of the financial realities and reduced Federal funding," there was nothing "wrong or
oppressive in [the] defendants' decision to raise tuition." Id. at 1045, 381 N.E.2d at 27. In
deciding the duress claim, the court might have considered whether a guarantee against large
tuition increases was a social norm. If not, then it might have been appropriate to reject the
duress claim; otherwise, it would be costly to deter future coercers who would have to be reeducated about the acceptable social norms. There is, of course, some circularity in this argument
since legal decisions can affect the nature of expected social norms of behavior.
267 A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 207-08 (discussing the example of the public and private
physicians).
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when parties are acting within societal norms is illustrated by Xerox
Corp. v. ISC Corp.268 In Xerox, the plaintiff, Xerox, contracted to sell
the defendant, ISC, certain computer software.2 69 Following a suggestion from Xerox, the defendant leased the computer hardware
necessary to run the programs from a third party, EDCON, who itself
had leased this hardware from Xerox. 270 Subsequently, EDCON defaulted in rental payments and Xerox cancelled its hardware lease. 271
This left ISC without the hardware necessary to run its programs,
making the software effectively useless.2 72 Xerox then proposed to
lease directly to ISC the necessary hardware in exchange for a settlement agreement and four promissory notes. 273 ISC acquiesced because it was left in a "difficult position" and needed the equipment.2 74
When Xerox sued ISC for failure to pay on the promissory notes,
ISC argued that the transaction was voidable for duress.275 The
defendant contended bad faith in the Xerox cancellation of EDCON's
lease and improper pressure on the defendant to agree to the new
lease terms. 276 The court refused to find duress, concluding that the
defendant could not "complain of duress simply because Xerox terminated a contract with a third party who failed to perform that
277
contract."
Analyzed from a doctrinal standpoint, Xerox had no legal obligation
to allow ISC access to the hardware. Therefore, an agreement that
gave ISC access on Xerox's terms, even if unpalatable to ISC, could
not be wrongful. The question of the wrongfulness of Xerox's actions,
however, is not quite so clear. First, focusing on legal rights will not
resolve the duress claim since acting within one's legal rights is not
an absolute shield. 278 The fact that Xerox had a legal right to propose
any lease terms is therefore not dispositive of the duress issue.
Moreover, if Xerox is conceptualized as a case about the limits of
exploiting another's economic necessities, the outcome is uncertain
since the propriety of capitalizing on a party's weakness to extract
favorable terms is itself problematic.279
632 P.2d 618 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
mId. at 619.
70
2 Id. at 622.
"2

71

2

272

Id.
Id.

2 3

7 Id. at 619.

27, Id.
275

Id.

27 6

Id.

at 622.

277Id.

271See

cases cited supra notes 51 and 52.
279 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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Efficiency concerns reflected in the policy of upholding agreements
when the coercer acts within the range of acceptable norms help to
make the result in the Xerox case compelling. If a court should find
duress, it would in effect be finding that a party with a lease could
not cancel that lease even for nonpayment of rent if doing so would
cause an unrelated third party economic hardship. That result would
be costly to enforce because it is contrary to behavior that is acceptable
in the business community.280 For this reason courts should be reluctant to grant a duress defense in such circumstances.

B. Encouraging Disclosure of Unexpected Risks
Decisions in duress cases should incorporate a policy that encourages
the disclosure of unusual or unexpected risks and material information. 281 Failure of one party to disclose an unusual risk or material
information known only to that party should enable the ignorant
party to prevail on a duress claim when the "coercer" attempts to
capitalize on risks that are outside the risks associated with a particular transaction.2 8 2 Granting duress in such circumstances would
provide an incentive to the knowledgeable party to disclose such
information and prevent a misallocation of resources based on imperfect or incomplete information. This would enhance the efficient
allocation of resources by giving both parties an incentive to provide
enough information to allow each of them to determine whether the
deal they are entering into maximizes value.283
Adams v. Schiffer 28 illustrates why duress claims should succeed
when the coercer seeks to impose a risk that is not one of the
normally foreseeable risks of a transaction. In Adams, the defendant,
Schiffer, purchased property from Adams. 285 Thereafter, Adams' son
Richard made a claim to the property. 286 Schiffer gave Richard $10,000
280See

Gordon, supra note 3, at 203-10.

211Cf. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854) (reflecting on the relationship

between the unforseeable risks flowing from a contract, and the measure of damages to be
awarded if those risks occur).
282In an analogous situation, in cases involving a unilateral mistake by one party which the
other party has reason to know about, courts are likely to excuse the mistaken party. See
Kronman, supra note 164, at 5-9 (discussing the rationale for excusing unilateral mistake).
283Cf.

id. at 7-8 (suggesting an allocation of risk to minimize the "joint costs" of a unilateral

mistake; the risk
28411 Colo. 15,
28
Id. at 16, 17
2N Id. at 23, 17

should be on the party in the best position to prevent a costly mistake).

17 P. 21 (1888).
P. at 22.
P. at 25-26.
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to quiet title, 28 7 and then sought reimbursement from Adams senior,
who refused to pay. 2ss To pressure Adams, Schiffer persuaded his
brother, who was his banking partner, to refuse to allow Adams to
draw on his bank account.2 8 9 Adams ultimately settled in order to
obtain a release of his funds, and then brought suit to recover the
settlement. 290 The court found that the settlement was void for du29 1
ress.
The outcome is not justifiable in doctrinal terms because the court
did not explain why the pursuit of a legal remedy was not a reasonable
alternative for Adams senior. 292 Nor is it clear that the threat to tie
up the father's account is illegal and therefore wrongful under the
Restatement.293 Furthermore, because it is not clear whether the bank's
refusal to release funds was morally wrongful or whether such conduct
would constitute a wrongful action sufficient to satisfy the Restatement's requirements, application of the moral baseline theory to
Adams might be difficult. 294 But even if the doctrinal or moral baseline
approaches do not explain the outcome in Adams, policy considerations
on disclosure of risk militate in favor of the duress finding. Because
a bank depositor would not expect his account to be manipulated by
the bank for actions unrelated to the account, normal expectations
would be upset if duress were not found.2 95 Ordinarily this is not a
risk that would be foreseeable by a person opening a bank account,
therefore the burden should be on the other party to disclose that
risk or forego the opportunity of later exploiting it.
McCubbin v. Buss 296 provides another example of a failure to disclose
-7 Id. at 23, 37-39, 17 P. at 26, 32-33.
2mId. at 39, 17 P. at 33.
"2 Id. at 34, 40, 17 P. at 31, 33.
29Id. at 40, 17 P. at 34.
21Id.

n2See Dalzell, Duress II, supra note 40, at 341-42 (discussing Adams v. Schiffer and noting
the failure of the court to consider whether Adams had alternative remedies available). This
failure is puzzling in view of the requirement under the Restatement that the party seeking
relief must have had no other choice or reasonable alternative but acquiescence. See supra note

108. The policy based on unexpected risks conflicts with the policy discussed supra text
accompanying notes 132-6 1, positing the benefits of a policy of judicial economy. Perhaps these

two competing policies cannot be reconciled, but there is no reason why one should overshadow
the other.
" See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text. Although the court does conclude that the
interference with the plaintiffs bank account was an unlawful interference, Adams, 11 Colo. at
40, 17 P. at 33-34, the withholding of the money constitutes no crime or tort and thus the
court must decide if the withholding is an improper threat.
"NSee supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text (discussing how a moral baseline distinguishes
a coercive from a noncoercive proposal).
2' See Adams, 11 Colo. at 40, 17 P. at 34 (discussing the normal relationship between a

depositor and a bank).
180 Neb. 624, 144 N.W.2d 175 (1966).

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 53

an unexpected risk. In McCubbin, the plaintiff was a stockholder and
general manager of a close corporation.2 97 Shortly after the defendant
became the majority stockholder, the defendant first tried to persuade
the plaintiff to agree to a contract that would have cancelled a stockpurchase contract, and then threatened to terminate plaintiff's employment in order to induce cancellation of the stock-purchase con98
tract.
The plaintiff signed the cancellation contract, but his employment
was nevertheless terminated. He then brought an action for rescission
of the cancellation contract and reinstatement of the stock option.2 99
The court found business compulsion 30 0 evident on the facts, entitling
the plaintiff to recission and reinstatement of the stock-purchase
30
contract. 1
The plaintiff could not have reasonably anticipated that his continued employment would depend on giving up a stock option. 30 2
Rather, he would have anticipated that it would depend on his
performance and economic conditions. Because giving up a stock
option is not within the normal realm of expected risk, the parties
would not have bargained regarding that particular risk. For this
reason, the employer should have an obligation to disclose the risk
or forego the opportunity to capitalize on it later. This policy of
disclosing unusual risks to the other party would prevent enforcement
of contracts where the risks had not been disclosed.30 3
291Id.

at 625, 144 N.W.2d at 177.
Id. at 627, 144 N.W.2d at 178.
Id. at 625, 144 N.W.2d at 177.
300Business compulsion is another term used to describe economic duress. See, e.g., Dalzell,
Duress I, supra note 4, at 240 & n.6.
01McCubbin, 180 Neb. at 631, 144 N.W.2d at 180.
302McCubbin may be explained in two ways other than the policy of requiring certain parties
29

to disclose unexpected risks. The first explanation is based on unjust enrichment. Buss was
arguably unjustly enriched when McCubbin gave up his stock option. An alternative explanation
for the result is put forth by Professor Farnsworth: "Duress may be found if, for example, an
employer who has the right to terminate the employment at will threatens to fire an employee
as a means of obtaining some unrelated advantage ....
" E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, §
4.17, at 262; see also Conybeare, supra note 87, at 1028 (discussing the distinction used to
decide extortion cases that is based on "whether there is a clear nexus between the act threatened
and the property demanded"). However, the explanation based on the disclosure of unexpected
risk is a plausible one and is consistent with the fraud cases discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 211-46.
33If one party can easily, and at low cost, disclose information that would affect the other
party's decision to proceed with the transaction, and the other party would not have expected
the nondisclosed risk, the duress rules should require disclosure. Illustrative is Peter Matthews,
Ltd. v. Robert Mabey, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 943, 499. N.Y.S.2d 254 (1986). In Mabey, a moving
company, after a truck was loaded with the plaintiff's personal property, refused to proceed
unless the plaintiff agreed to a $15,000 limit on damages. Id. at 943-44, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 255-
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C. Denying Duress to Avoid Judicial Capability Problems

Judicial capability 3 4 should also affect the availability of duress
relief. If granting the duress claim would involve the court in having
to set a price or undo a transaction that would necessitate a complex
valuation, the court should be reluctant to grant the duress claim.
Valuation is best left to the parties, 3 5 and the court should not
become involved in a question it may be ill-equipped to resolve. On
the other hand, if judicial grants of duress will not involve the court
in valuation questions, the court should be more willing to grant
relief. Recognition of judicial capability problems would help to resolve
ambiguities that arise under current doctrinal analysis.
King Enterprises v. Manchester Water Works 30 6 illustrates a case
in which the granting of relief would have involved the court in
setting a price for services. In King Enterprises, the plaintiff began
construction of an apartment complex and then requested that the
30 7
defendant, the city water company, provide the necessary water.
The defendant responded by demanding the payment of an assessment, but the plaintiff refused to pay the requested amount.30 8 Subsequently, the parties agreed to a price concession.30 9 After construction of the water main was undertaken by the defendant, however,
the plaintiff refused to pay, alleging that the agreement was void for
duress.310 In its analysis, the King Enterprises court recognized the
two key doctrinal elements of duress: a wrongful act and an absence
of reasonable alternatives.3 11 To resolve whether the agreement was
56. The plaintiff argued duress and the court found "facts sufficient to withstand [the defendant's
motion for] summary judgment" noting that the plaintiff had no "practical alternative to
compliance." Id. at 944, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
Mabey can also be analyzed in terms of forced disclosure. The defendant could have easily
disclosed the $15,000 damage limit before the plaintiff agreed to use his services; therefore a
failure to disclose that fact should preclude the defendant from capitalizing on the limit since
the plaintiff could reasonably have anticipated that a mover would provide full coverage absent
disclosure on limits of liability. Forcing the disclosure would have the societal benefit of meeting
the parties' reasonable expectations and of permitting similarly situated plaintiffs to devote
their resources to their highest valued uses.
"I See supra note 43.
305
Leaving valuation to the parties is a main tenet of classical contract law. Dalton, supra
note 3, at 1068. This concept has come under attack recently by critics who have postulated
the importance of public policy considerations that run counter to these classic individualistic
values. See supra note 5.
- 122 N.H. 1011, 453 A.2d 1276 (1982).
307
Id. at 1013, 453 A.2d at 1276-77.
3MId., 453 A.2d at 1277.
3ogId.
310Id.

311Id. at 1014, 453 A.2d at 1277.
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in fact voluntary, the court looked at the fairness of the bargaining
process. 321 The court found the agreement to be "a product of free
and voluntary negotiations" because the purported coercer engaged
in a give-and-take with the alleged victim, and made a price conces14
sion.3 13 The court found no wrongful acts by the defendant.
The court concluded that duress should not be available because
the water company did not cause the developer's need for water
connections to become acute, and in fact the developer himself caused
the crisis and had reasonable alternatives.3 15 Yet, these rationales do
not necessarily insulate an agreement from attack on duress grounds
and thus they may not represent the best analysis.
A policy that might provide more effective guidance to a court than
that offered by the doctrinal analysis is the judicial capability policy.
Granting duress relief in the King Enterprises case would have enmeshed the court in determining the appropriate price for the water
connections. This problem is likely to occur because once the agreement between the parties is voided, the water works company may
now bring a lawsuit to recover the reasonable value of the requested
connections. The court should be reluctant to void the agreement on
grounds of duress because it would embroil the court in a price
dispute.3 16 Because the court's doctrinal analysis is not necessarily
compelling, judicial capability more appropriately justifies the finding
of no duress. To avoid judicial capability problems, there should be
a willingness to grant duress relief when that finding will not enmesh
the court in economic evaluations. Courts should be more willing to
312

Id. at 1014-15, 453 A.2d at 1277-78.

"I Id. at 1014, 453 A.2d at 1277. Nevertheless, if voluntariness is the test, it is not clear why

some negotiating indicates that a final proposal by the putative coercer is any more acceptable
or voluntarily assented to under the circumstances.
3"4 Id., 453 A.2d at 1278.
35 Id. at 1014-15, 453 A.2d at 1278; see supra note 190 and accompanying text.
316Another case in which a grant of the duress claim would enmesh the court in an economic
evaluation that a court may be ill-equipped to handle on judicial capability grounds is Grad v.
Roberts, 14 N.Y.2d 70, 198 N.E.2d 26, 248 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1964). In Grad, the plaintiff was
indebted to the defendant for engineering services. Id. at 72, 198 N.E.2d at 26, 248 N.Y.S.2d
at 634. To pressure the plaintiff into paying the debt, the defendant refused to transfer stock

to the plaintiff unless the plaintiff paid his debt. Id. at 73, 198 N.E.2d at 27, 248 N.Y.S.2d at
635. The plaintiff agreed to secure the stock transfer, but later argued the agreement should
be voidable for duress. Id. The court disagreed, stating that it was "but simple justice" for the

defendant to exploit his strategic stock advantage. Id. at 74, 198 N.E.2d at 28, 248 N.Y.S.2d
at 636.

Under a contrary holding the plaintiff would have been able to rescind the agreement regarding
the debt and to recover the money paid, but this would have required the court to evaluate
the defendant's release of the stock. If the debt agreement is voided, the court might have to
readjust the terms of the stock deal to account for the lost ability to secure the payment. That
valuation might be one the court is ill-equipped to handle.
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grant relief if they can simply undo a transaction without facing the
added burden of making economic evaluations. The court may, for
example, void a deed executed by an anguished parent which was
conveyed to a third party to prevent the criminal prosecution of an
adult child. 317 This would entail no complex valuation question since
the court can simply reverse the transaction. Similarly, even when a
grant of duress upsets a transaction, but there is clear evidence of
what the parties thought the services were worth, there will not be
judicial capacity problems. The court in those instances would not
be starting from scratch in setting prices.
The judicial capability concept is illustrated by Rich & Whillock,
Inc. v. Ashton Development, Inc.318 In Rich & Whillock the parties
agreed on a price for excavation work and also agreed that any extra
rock work would be done at current rental rates. 31 9 The general
contractor's actions caused the subcontractor to believe that there
would be no problem with payment.32 0 After the subcontractor completed performance, the general contractor offered a reduced amount
to cover the additional expense. 321 Granting the duress claim in this
case would not involve the court in an inquiry into the appropriate
payment because the parties had already agreed that current rental
rates would apply. The court can therefore undo the transaction
without taking on the added burden of determining the value of the
services. The court should therefore be more willing to grant relief.

D. Judicial Risk Reallocation: Speculation at the Other Party's
Expense

Risk allocation 322 provides another guide for deciding duress cases.
If the parties have allocated risks in a certain fashion, and one party
tries to rely on duress so as to reallocate the risk, duress should not
31 See

Haumont v. Security State Bank, 220 Neb. 809, 374 N.W.2d 2 (1985).
Cal. App. 3d 1154, 204 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1984).
319Id. at 1156, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
318157
320 Id.,
321 Id.

204 Cal. Rptr. at 87-88.

at 1156-57, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
322Risk allocation concepts also figure prominently in the doctrine of commercial impracticability. See Halpern, supra note 251, at 1160-61 (discussing the efficiency model for allocating
risks in a way that is consistent with the allocation parties would have made for future
contingencies had the requisite information been available).
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be available.323 Reallocation of risk on grounds of duress would en-

courage economic negligence by protecting parties from erroneous risk
calculations. Moreover, such reallocation of risk by the courts would
contribute to the misallocation of resources. Parties would have to
assume the risk that courts will bail out the losing party. Even when
the parties do not allocate the risks explicitly, the court should not
grant a duress claim when doing so would make the transaction
essentially risk free for the complaining party. Moreover, permitting
parties to have it both ways 324 and voiding contracts whenever it is

desirable to do so, would upset the basic tenet of contract law, which
prohibits parties from speculating at one another's expense.3 2 5 Finally,

most parties expect that if risks are assumed on both sides, there is
equivalence in the deal. Permitting duress in those circumstances
would unduly burden the party who must326ferret out involuntariness
in circumstances that bespeak normalcy.

Risk reallocation concepts are illustrated by First Data Resources,
3 27 Under the contract involved in
Inc. v. Omaha Steaks International.
First Data, either party could terminate the agreement on ninety days
notice.3

28

The plaintiff wrote a letter notifying the defendant that it

would exercise its right to terminate the contract unless a higher
price was negotiated.3

29

The defendant agreed to a price increase, but

later refused to pay. 30 When the plaintiff sued for payment,
the
331
grounds.
duress
on
agreement
the
avoid
to
sought
defendant
First Data can be explained under the current doctrinal approach
of determining the existence of an improper threat and of a reasonable
alternative. 332 The advantage of the risk allocation analysis (discussed
323Arguably, the disinclination to reallocate risks is merely another way of saying that if the

party is acting within her legal rights, then duress should not be available, but if a party is
exceeding her legal rights, then duress should be available. By definition, if a party is acting
within her legal rights, she is not trying to reallocate risks, while if a party is exceeding her
legal rights she may be trying to do so. Nevertheless, risk reallocation analysis offers several
advantages. It provides a persuasive economic rationale for case results. It may also help to
reach a result when doctrinal limitations do not provide a clear answer. See infra text accompanying notes 327-41.
32I Courts are reluctant to permit a party to "have its cake and eat it too." Red-Samm Mining
Co. v. Port of Seattle, 8 Wash. App. 610, 616, 508 P.2d 175, 178 (1973).
' For a discussion of the anti-speculation policy in contract law as it is manifested in the
mutuality of obligation principle, see E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 107-08.
326 See supra text accompanying notes 162-209.
327209 Neb. 327, 307 N.W.2d 790 (1981).
328
Id. at 329, 307 N.W.2d at 792.
329Id.

330

Id. at 329-30, 307 N.W.2d at 792.
at 330-31, 307 N.W.2d at 792.
332Since the contract permitted termination upon ninety days notice, it was not improper to
3, Id.

give notice. Thus there was no improper threat and any proposal that made the recipient "better
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below) over these modes of analysis is that it provides a persuasive
economic rationale for the no duress result.
Application of risk allocation concepts 333 suggests that voiding the
modified agreement should not be allowed because it would insulate
the defendant from one of the very risks that he initially undertook.
The defendant took the risk that after the contract was terminated
pursuant to its terms any aspect of the contract could be renegotiated,
including the price. Permitting a duress claim to succeed would in
effect give the defendant a better deal than he received from the
contract. It would also give contracting parties an incentive to acquiesce in modifications, knowing they could later avoid them on the
ground of duress. Thus they would be insulated from risk and gain
one-sided protection from the courts.
First Data can also be analyzed in terms of misallocation of resources. The defendant, knowing that without the price increase the
plaintiff would terminate the contract, contributes to the plaintiff's
misallocation of resources by abiding by the modified contract terms
in order to get a temporary extension of the contract. The risk
allocation analysis suggests that duress should not be granted when
doing so would make the transaction risk-free for one party at the
expense of the other. Permitting the duress claim under such circumstances would contribute to an easily preventable misallocation
of resources. In these cases, the party who is attempting to gain a
risk-free transaction knows at the time of formation that there would
have been no deal if the other party had known that the supposed
victim intended to speculate at the other's expense and then allege
duress to get out of a transaction if it turned out to be unfavorable.
Because no one would enter into such a transaction, the party who
plans to speculate is in the best position to prevent a misallocation
of resources and the duress defense should not be allowed to that
party.
Higgins v. Brunswick Corp.334 typifies the problem of permitting a
claim of duress by a party attempting to insulate itself from risk. In
Higgins, the plaintiffs, real estate brokers, constructed a bowling alley
and purchased bowling equipment from the defendants.3 35 Subsequently, when the plaintiffs defaulted in their payments and filed a
off" than he would be upon termination would be a noncoercive offer. A moral baseline approach
suggests the same result since the plaintiff has no obligation to continue the contract. Nevertheless, since the contractual rights test is so manipulable as to be an unreliable mode of
analysis, exclusive reliance on it seems misplaced.
See supra text accompanying notes 322-32.
176 Ill. App. 3d 273, 395 N.E.2d 81 (1979).
3 Id. at 274, 395 N.E.2d at 83.
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petition for bankruptcy, the defendants filed an action seeking repossession of the equipment and payment of the outstanding balance. 336 The defendants agreed to abandon the legal action and to
satisfy the claims of the plaintiffs' unsecured creditors in return for
a lease for the bowling alley. 337 Plaintiffs agreed, but later attempted
to rescind the lease on the grounds of duress. 33 1 The court rejected
the claim based on the voluntariness of the agreement, the plaintiffs'
access to counsel, the defendant's innocence in the plaintiffs' economic
reversals, and the absence of any bargaining power abuse. 339 Because
some of these factors are manipulable by the courts 340 and are either
not sufficient in themselves or too conclusory to justify a finding of
duress, the relevant focus should be the normative issue: Should
duress be available as a defense?
The better explanation for denying relief to the plaintiffs in Higgins
can be found in the plaintiffs' attempt to insulate themselves from
all risk. The defendants took a calculated risk that the bowling alley
would not be profitable enough to justify the agreed upon rent; the
plaintiffs took the risk that the lease would turn out to be more
valuable than the rent. Under these circumstances, granting duress
relief to a party who has gambled and lost on a calculated risk in
effect allows one party to speculate at the expense of the other and
to recapture an opportunity that he has foregone in contracting. 341
This approach fails to put the requisite pressure on the party in the
best position to prevent a misallocation of resources.
E.

Reliance: Its Actual and Desired Effect on Outcome

Another factor which does and should affect outcome is the relative
degree of reliance between the purported coercer and alleged victim. 342
If the victim has relied to its detriment on assurances by the coercer
336Id. at 275, 395 N.E.2d at 83.
337Id.

Id. at 276, 395 N.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 277-78, 395 N.E.2d at 85-86.
3,0 For instance, the voluntariness test has no established standards and thus is easily manipulated. Furthermore, the defendant's participation, or lack thereof, in the plaintiff's economic
reversals is not always determinative of whether the agreement is voidable for duress. See supra
notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
-1 Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 369, 376-38 (1980) (discussing breach of contract as an attempt to recapture "forgone
opportunities").
314Professor

Hillman disputes the importance of reliance as a precondition for arguing a

successful duress claim. See Hiliman, Contract Modifications, supra note 162, at 872.
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and the coercer has not relied in an equivalent fashion, the court
should be more willing to grant the victim's duress claim. If, however,
the alleged coercer has relied to its detriment on the victim's assurances in a way that the victim has not, the court should be more
likely to deny the duress claim. Where neither the victim nor coercer
has relied detrimentally, the court should consider the other policies
outlined in this Article when determining whether to grant relief.
Wurtz v. Fleischman343 provides an illustration of disparate reliance
between the coercer and victim. In Wurtz, the buyer and seller entered
into a real estate deal in which the buyer agreed to pay with an

344
exchange of property rather than with cash for the seller's tax benefit.

Pursuant to the agreement, the seller commenced a search for property
suitable for the exchange. 345 The buyer purchased a McDonald's
restaurant at the seller's request. 346 Because the restaurant was only

valued at $246,400 and the agreement called for $300,000 in real
estate, the parties agreed to an extension to give the seller time to
decide on the additional property needed to close the deal. 347 After

the buyer expended $150,000 to purchase the restaurant, the seller
threatened to cancel the closing unless the buyer came up with an
extra $50,000 worth of property. 348 To close the deal, the buyer agreed,
but later claimed duress. 349 Because an exclusive reliance on doctrinal
analysis would be likely to result in inconsistent outcomes for similar
fact patterns in such cases, 350 this Article advocates that the courts
34389 Wis. 2d 291, 278 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 293 N.W.2d 155

(1980). Although reversed, the Wurtz appellate court's rendition of the facts provide a good
basis for discussion.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the appellate court "exceeded its authority
by making factual determinations in lieu of, and in addition to, the findings made by the trial
court." Wurtz, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 102, 293 N.W.2d 155, 156 (1980). The case was remanded to
the trial court to "make the necessary findings" for appellate review. Id. at 109, 293 N.W.2d
at 159-60.
34 Wurtz, 89 Wis. 2d at 298, 278 N.W.2d at 268.
345Id.
3
4Id.
34'7

Id.

348Id.

at 299, 303, 278 N.W.2d at 269, 270.
Id. at 300, 278 N.W.2d at 269.
30 In Wurtz, it would be difficult to resolve the propriety of the threat not to close unless
additional value were forthcoming. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1979).
Courts have dealt with similar claims in the real estate context and have reached different
conclusions on the availability of duress. Compare Smelo v. Girard Trust Co., 158 Pa. Super.
473, 45 A.2d 264 (1946) (developer who paid $3,000 down and incurred additional obligations
was found to be the victim of duress, and a modified agreement, which obligated him to pay
penalties on back taxes and which was signed to prevent cancellation of a land sale, was found
to be voidable) with London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262
(1965) (even though plaintiff expended more than $150,000 in reliance on first agreement, duress
39
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focus on reliance concerns. The buyer had relied by making expenditures at the seller's request.3 51 The seller demonstrated no equivalent
detrimental reliance.3 5 Therefore, it may be appropriate to grant a
duress claim.
Use of the reliance factor to decide duress claims is supported by
several factors. First, to the extent that reliance results in a benefit
to the coercer, the coercer should be made to pay. Any agreements
which avoid that obligation should be voidable. Second, to the extent
that the reliance is foreseeable, and exploited by the coercer, duress
should be granted on the theory that otherwise the party in the best
position to avoid a resource misallocation would benefit from a failure
to do so. Finally, a denial of duress will increase the costs of contracting in the future. Parties will refuse to accede to other parties'
requests for their reliance expenditures without significant guarantees
of performance.
F.

Societal Effects of Treatment of Duress Claims

Another policy goal that courts should consider in duress claims
is the effect that the decision will have on behavior that society wants
to encourage or discourage. If the denial of duress will harm important
societal goals, then the duress claim should be granted.353 The importance of these societal goals should override technical and doctrinal
deficiencies of duress claims. Conversely, if a denial of duress will
promote important goals, the defense should be available. This social
policy helps to rationalize and justify results in the cases that cannot
be explained under current theories.
35 4
In S.S. & 0. Corp. v. Township of Bernards Sewerage Authority,
the municipality granted certain necessary permits to a developer
sufficient to void the renegotiated agreement was not found). In some of the cases focusing on
the "no reasonable alternative" criteria courts have found that a victim's failure to pursue
litigation dooms the duress claim, even if the delay caused by the litigation would entail economic
hardship. See, e.g., id. (because plaintiff did not sue for breach of the original contract due to
business pressures, the court found that the renegotiated contract, in which plaintiff agreed to
pay an additional $650 per acre, was voluntarily entered into). Other courts have reached
contrary results. See, e.g., Ross Sys. v. Linden Dari-Delite, Inc., 35 N.J. 329, 337, 173 A.2d
258, 263 (1961) ("[T]ested by the practicalities of the business situation in which the defendants
here found themselves, we think they had no adequate remedy through any form of litigation.").
351Wurtz, 89 Wis. 2d at 303, 278 N.W.2d at 270.
352Id. at 304, 278 N.W.2d at 271.
353As noted supra note 37, Professor Wertheimer would discount the importance of societal
effects in deciding duress claims.
3 4 62 N.J. 369, 301 A.2d 738 (1973).
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that were conditioned on the developer's entering into a written
contract for adequate sewage connections. 355 The developer entered a
contract by which he agreed to pay $900 for each sewage connection
and also agreed to disclaim that any coercion had been applied by
the Authority.35 6 The developer later contended that the charges should
only have been $700357 and that the payments had been made to the
35 8
Authority under coercion.
A grant of relief here is not easily justified under a doctrinal analysis
because there is no showing that the claimant explored other reasonable alternatives. But the public policy implications of denying
the duress claim to the developer, and the incentives to undesirable
behavior that would result, dictate a finding of duress. Were the court
to deny that coercion existed in S.S. & 0., the Authority would have
a strong incentive to disregard clear legal mandates. Moreover, because
the Authority engages in many transactions with developers, it would
be more efficient to deter the Authority than to put the risk on each
individual developer. 35 9 Thus, the public policy analysis helps to resolve
an ambiguity in the doctrinal analysis.
The public policy of providing incentives for economic development
would resolve other duress claims when the resolution would otherwise
be uncertain under doctrinal tests or other theories of coercion. In
Lustgarten v. Jones,360 the plaintiffs wanted to enter the gasohol
market and sought out defendants because of their business contacts
and expertise. 361 The parties reached an agreement to form a corporation pursuant to which each subscribed to a certain number of
shares. 362 After the agreement was made, defendants contacted an oil
company to obtain a lease for the new corporation.3 63 Because the
new company was undercapitalized, the oil company declined. 364 Thereafter, defendants informed plaintiffs that the company's finances were
hampering efforts to successfully enter the gasohol market.365 The

"I
Id.at
3

372, 301 A.2d at 740.
Id. at 372-73, 301 A.2d at 740.
Id. at 376, 301 A.2d at 742.
357
3
" Id. at 371, 301 A.2d at 739.
31 For efficient deterrence purposes it would be important to deter municipal authorities rather
than developers. See generally Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study
in Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 127-35 (1988) (suggesting that efficient
deterrence policies would place the incentives for deterrence on the professional wrongdoer).
m 220 Neb. 585, 371 N.W.2d 668 (1985).
361 Id. at 586, 371 N.W.2d at 669.
32 Id. at 586-87, 371 N.W.2d at 669-70.
Id. at 587, 371 N.W.2d at 670.
36

4Id.

36 Id. at 588, 371 N.W.2d at 670.
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parties entered a new agreement that voided the earlier stock agreement.3 66 The plaintiffs then sued to void the second agreement on
the ground of duress. 367 The plaintiffs, who were seeking recission,
argued that duress arose from the "'substantial difference in economic
position and business experience"' between the parties.3 68 In rejecting
a duress claim based on the above facts, the court found that the
pressure arose not from actions of the defendant, but from the actions
of third party oil companies.3 69 Moreover, the court found that the
370
deal was not "unjust, unconscionable or illegal.
The doctrinal analysis is deficient for resolving the question on
these facts. First, the court's emphasis on the fact that the purported
coercer was not the cause of the economic adversity for the plaintiffs
is, as demonstrated earlier, a manipulable factor and not determinative
of outcome.3 71 But even when the coercer exploits the economic
necessities of the duress claimant, which the claimant herself caused,
the exploitation may in some instances be sufficient to justify a
3 72
finding of wrongful pressure.
A morality-based analysis would focus on the propriety of the
coercer's actions. 373 Under a strict rights normative analysis one might
conclude that the defendants had the "right" to request a termination
of the agreement since they were not bound by the first agreement
to stay in business with the plaintiffs forever. Application of a strict
rights analysis would examine whether the defendants had the right
to request that the earlier agreement be replaced with a different
agreement. Arguably, since the earlier agreement did not specifically
prohibit termination, there was no limit on the right to terminate.
Yet it is difficult to determine in the abstract whether the defendants'
request for termination was wrongful. The problem with the rights
analysis is that the determination as to when rights exist or when
one is obligated to do something is manipulable and therefore inconclusive.3 7 4 Such threats may or may not be wrongful when measured
against a baseline which is not absolute.3 75 Where the line is drawn
depends on value judgments about what kind of behavior society
3

WId.
367
Id. at 589, 371 N.W.2d at 671.
8
"
Id.

Id. at 592, 371 N.W.2d at 672. It would therefore be inefficient to deter the defendant.
370 Id.

371See

supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
373
See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
374
See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
375
See supra notes 96-107.
372See
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wants to promote or will tolerate. It is important that these lines be
drawn since there does not seem to be any easy means of resolving
the issue according to ambiguous or abstract rights.
Because the moral baseline standards are manipulable, the duress
determination should be based on social policy 'considerations. The
relevant question to ask is what kind of behavior does society want
to permit in a situation involving a risky business venture that one
party decides to terminate when the business encounters difficulties?
If proposals to terminate the business are voidable for duress when
the venture fails, then one party is insulated against the risk of the
venture failing. Such a result would contravene expected business
norms that each party assumes the risk of failure. Otherwise, one
party would be offering to indemnify the other, thus discouraging
investment in new ventures. Parties with expertise would be reluctant
to provide help to a fledgling company if the other party could insulate
itself from all risk should the venture fail. Policy concerns suggest
that the duress claim be denied to insure requisite incentives for
business ventures.

G. Economic Negligence and Duress Case Outcomes
A final policy which courts should consider in deciding duress cases
is the encouragement of economic industriousness and discouragement
of economic negligence. If the denial of duress would provide a
disincentive to careful economic planning by someone who is a position
to plan and to minimize the "joint costs" of a mistake, 376 then the
duress claim should be granted.
Beznos v. Martin,377 described previously, 378 illustrates a situation
in which economic negligence concerns should affect the duress claim.
The plaintiff in Beznos owned two adjacent lots, one of which was
vacant. 379 While the plaintiff was negotiating to sell the lot with the
house, he sold the vacant lot to the defendant. 3 0 It turned out that
3
the driveway from Lot 1 encroached on the defendant's vacant lot. 1
The defendant then threatened to destroy the driveway unless he
376Kronman, supra note 164, at 14.
31722 Mich. App. 376, 177 N.W.2d 226 (1970).
37'See supra notes 147-61 (describing Beznos and analyzing the facts in terms of both judicial
economy and the Restatement).
'79Beznos, 22 Mich. App. at 377, 177 N.W.2d at 226.
m Id., 177 N.W.2d at 226-27.
381Id., 177 N.W.2d at 227.
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was paid $1,500 for a reconveyance. 3 2 The plaintiff acquiesced because
the destruction of the driveway would have prevented the sale of the
lot with the house.38 3 The plaintiff later argued that the agreement
to pay $1,500 in return for the deed was executed under duress.384
Accepting that the case would be difficult to decide under current
doctrinal approaches, 3 85 consider how the case would be resolved by
an economic industriousness analysis. Since property owners are in
the best position to know what they are selling and would not have
to undertake search costs to determine what they own, that party
should be allocated the risk that the property is different than what
is deeded. Moreover, allocation of the risk to the purchaser would
increase the burden of contracting to an undesirable level. The purchaser would have no reason to suspect that when he bought the
property, he received less than all of the rights that were promised.
Permitting a duress claim to succeed in Beznos would be a disincentive to the seller to use care in describing the property to be sold.
Moreover, the seller, who is in the best position to prevent a misallocation of resources, would not be encouraged to do so. Thus, in
order to encourage careful economic planning and to prevent resource
misallocation, the seller should not be permitted to avoid a contract
on duress grounds.
Avoidance on duress grounds also should not be available where it
would insulate a party from the consequences of his own mistakes
and economic miscalculations. This might encourage business people
to think that the courts would give them an out and save them from
the usual consequences of their contract defaults. This might also
encourage them to invest in contracts on the mistaken assumption
that courts would reallocate the losses to favor one party.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Courts confront difficult choices when they decide which factual'
38,
Id. at 377-78, 177 N.W.2d at 227.
3 Id. at 378, 177 N.W.2d at 227.
3
84Id.

See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text; see also USLife Title Co. v. Gutkin, 152
Ariz. 349, 732 P.2d 579 (1986). This case provides another example of a case in which an
economic analysis would be beneficial. The vendors intended to convey certain property to the
purchasers, but the property was not so conveyed because of escrow agent's clerical error in
preparing the deed. Id. at 353, 732 P.2d at 583. The court found that it did not constitute
duress for the vendors to insist on a $17,000 payment to convey the disputed property. Id. at
356, 732 P.2d at 586. Any other result would encourage the escrow agent to be negligent in
preparing other deeds, which would create incentive for sloppy preparation of deeds by party
in charge.
38
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situations warrant relief on duress grounds. The current articulations
and applications of the duress rule are unsatisfactory. Moreover, the
available theories of coercion are both inherently unworkable and
inadequate because they do not address central policy issues. Consequently, courts do not consistently reach sound results.
Policy considerations based on efficiency, reliance, judicial capability, disclosure of unexpected risks, and economic incentives must
be integrated into the law of duress. Such integration would enhance
the predictability of judicial decisionmaking by offering an alternative
analysis for courts to use when doctrinal elements of duress prove
difficult to apply. Moreover, this approach would achieve certain
societal benefits. It would enhance the preservation of limited judicial
resources, contribute to a more efficient allocation of resources, discourage speculation in contracting, and provide appropriate incentives
for economic industriousness. The courts should incorporate these
policy concerns and develop guidelines consistent with them in order
to achieve rational and effective decisionmaking in duress cases.

